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RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SECURITIES LAW
I.

THE DEFINITION OF A SECURITY UNDER THE

1933

AND

1934

SECURITIES ACTS

A.

Introduction

In the years immediately following the Great Depression, an increasing concern arose for the regulation and control of securities activities. The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)' and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' were the initial products of this concern.
The main thrust of the 1933 Act was to regulate public offerings of
securities by requiring the registration of most securities prior to their
offer and sale.3 For the purposes of the 1933 Act,
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock,

bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional

undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-

curity," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the fore4
going.
The 1934 Act, primarily concerned with antifraud provisions, cre-

ated the Securities Exchange Commission and extended federal regulation to reach the trade of securities that were already issued and
outstanding. A potential controversy arose when the language used to
define "securities" in the 1934 Act varied in several ways from the language in the 1933 Act.' However, the definition of "security" provided
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1971 & Supp. 1972-1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1971 & Supp. 1972-1979).

3. Prior to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, administration of the 1933 Act was
assigned to the Federal Trade Commission.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1977).
5. As provided in the 1934 Act,

[t]he term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certif-
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in the 1934 Act was declared to be "virtually identical" to that of the
1933 Act and was subsequently treated as such.
However, this did not quell the growing controversy over the lan-

guage of the two Acts. The definitions, patterned after the early state
blue sky regulations,7 did not purport to contain exclusive, rigid catalogues of security transactions, but, rather, were broad enough to allow
the courts great latitude in their interpretation. Thus, present day
courts have been able to employ those same definitions created in the
early 1930's when confronting the problem of defining the extent and
scope of today's complex, multi-level financial schemes. In establishing
boundaries for elusive concepts such as "investment contracts," the
courts have responded by providing continually expanding readings of
"security."
B.

Early Decisions

1. SEC v. JoinerLeasing Corp.
In SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp.,' the Supreme Court was called

upon for the first time to determine whether a particular transaction
was governed by the Securities Acts. The case involved the sale of assignments of oil leases. The leases were granted with the agreement
that a test well would be drilled by the lessees. The Joiner Corporation

undertook to finance the drilling, and initiated a mail campaign to encourage investment in the project. Suit was brought when the securities
were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In analyzing the transaction, the Court rejected defendant's argument for the employment of the eusdem generis rule,9 as well as for the
icate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft,
bill of exchange, or bankers acceptance, which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1977).
6. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
7. For an interesting discussion of one such state regulation, see Brown, The Minnesota
"Blue Sky"Law, 3 MINN. L. REv. 149 (1919).
8. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
9. Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meIng, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
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maxim expressio unius est exclusio afterius." Instead, the Court laid the

foundation for all future cases by declaring that the test for construing
an investment contract should be determined not by the label that is
placed upon it, but, rather, by "what character the instrument is given
in commerce by terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the
economic inducements held out to the prospect."'" These factors, examined in light of congressional intent in enacting the Acts, led the
Court to find the transaction involved a security.
2. The Howey Test
A broad construction of the term "investment contract" was later
solidified in the landmark case of SEC v. W.J Howey Co.' 2 W.J.
Howey Company had offered certain citrus groves for sale to the general public. An affiliated company, Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.,
was advertised as a service company able to provide for the cultivation
and development of the groves. Prospective customers were not obligated to contract with both companies, but Howey Company stressed
the superiority of its affiliate in providing service and told customers
that it was not feasible to invest in a grove unless service arrangements
were made. Because it was impractical for most purchasers to participate in the development of their own land because of their lack of sophistication, absenteeism, and the economic difficulties of piecemeal
farming, eighty-five percent of the acreage sold was covered by service
contracts with Howey-in-the-Hils Service, Inc.
In determining that such an arrangement constituted an investment contract, the Court examined and relied upon early "blue sky"
laws and reinforced the method of analysis used in Joiner. The Court
called for "a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."' 3
However, the Court ventured beyond Joiner, instituting a controversial
and much discussed standard:
lAin investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby [1] a person
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1968).
10. The mention of one is the exclusion of the other. Id. at 692. In this particular instance, Joiner Corporation argued that sales of leasehold subdivisions by the acre should be
excluded from the definition of security because the statute expressly included sales of leasehold subdivisions by undivided shares. 320 U.S. at 350.
11. 320 U.S. at 352-53.

12. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
13. Id. at 299.
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invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to
expect profits [4] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal4 interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.1
This black letter test was readily adopted by the lower courts.
Early cases in the Ninth Circuit were quickly resolved by a literal application of the test, despite
its incorporation of vague concepts such as
"common enterprise." 5 However, the mechanical application of the
test drew increased criticism as financial schemes grew increasingly
complex. Many critics contended that the courts had created an arbitrary definition of investment contract that had become rigid and fixed
through judicial interpretation, and had failed to expand with the
financial schemes of the day. 16 It soon became readily apparent that
some modifications in the application of the test would be required if
the test were to remain a useful tool in defining securities.
Evolving modifications to the Howey test can be identified in the
two subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court regarding investment contracts.

In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.

(VALIC),' 7 the Court had to decide whether a variable annuity contract
was a security under the 1933 Act. A standard fixed annuity contract
offers the annuitant a specified amount per annum. Such contracts are
exempt from the 1933 Act.18 However, the variable annuity contract at
issue entitled the annuitant to fluctuating amounts based upon pro rata
participations in the company's investment portfolios and in the gains
and losses thereon.
In a five to four decision, the Court held that the transaction did
involve an investment contract. The importance of the decision lies in
the means of analysis, which, for the first time, focused on the economic reality of the transaction in terms of the allocation of risk assumed by the investor.' 9 The Court found that a variable annuity
14. Id. at 298-99.
15. E.g., Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961) (evidence including terms of defendants' offer, plan
of distribution, economic inducement held out to prospects and common enterprise supported finding that defendants' sales of second trust deeds constituted sales of securities).
16. E.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Securit'y Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to Return Investment
Contractsto the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135 (1971).
17. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
18. Under 15 U.S.C. § 77c(8) (1977), conventional life insurance and annuity packages
are exempt from the 1933 Act, with sole control being delegated to the states.
19. Justice Harlan's dissent, which was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Clark, and Whit-
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contract places all of the investment risk on the annuitant and none on
the company. This placed the contract outside of the conventional concept of "insurance" which involves some investment risk on the part of
the company.
Having decided that some investment on the part of the company
was required, the Court was next confronted with the problem of what
degree of risk or investment was necessary to place the transaction
within the concept of "insurance," rather than "security." In SEC v.
UnitedBeneft Life Insurance Co.,20 a Flexible Fund Annuity contract
was involved that was similar to the transaction in VALIC. The contract provided for a deferred or optional annuity plan, under which the
purchasers agreed to pay a fixed monthly premium for a certain
number of years, the funds being invested in common stocks to produce capital gains as well as interest return. The cash value of the purchaser's interest could be withdrawn before maturity, or at maturity
could be used to purchase a conventional fixed dollar annuity. The
purchaser was also entitled to an alternative guaranteed minimum cash
value which gradually increased from fifty percent of the net premiums
the first year to one hundred percent of the net premiums after ten
years.
Rejecting arguments that the guaranteed minimum provision in
shifting part of the risk from the purchaser to the company brought the
transaction within the insurance exemption, the Court found that the
accumulation provision of the Flexible Fund constituted an investment
contract. The Fund appealed to the puchaser "not on the usual insurance basis of stability and security but on the prospect of 'growth'
through investment management."21
The importance of these two cases lies in the reasoning of the
Court. Rather than mechanically applying the relevant statute, the
Court gave an indication that it might be willing to expand its means of
analysis by examining the economic reality of the transactions rather
than the labels that were placed upon them. Specifically, the Court
focused its concern upon the undisclosed risk of loss to the participants
in the plans. This focus allowed for the broader and more pervasive
means of analysis that was to follow in applying the Howey test to future cases.
A significant segment of the evolutionary process away from the
taker, urged a more mechanical application of the statute so as to protect the tradition of
state regulation and federal abstention in this area. 359 U.S. at 93.

20. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
21. Id. at 211.
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literal application of the test and toward a broader approach has occurred in other courts. In the landmark California case of Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski,22 Justice Traynor first articulated the concept
of "risk capital," a concept that was to be a crucial element in subsequent cases.
Silver Hills involved the promotion of a country club in which
funding was sought through the sale of memberships. The promoters
of the club had provided a downpayment of $400.00 on a contract to
purchase a twenty-two acre ranch for $75,000.00. The remaining funds
were to be procured through the sale of memberships that entitled
members to the use of all club facilities. The promoters contended that
the memberships did not constitute securities, in that membership was
not a beneficial interest in property since it offered no rights in either
the assets or income of the club. Rather, the promoters asserted that
the memberships were purchased for the use and enjoyment of the purchaser, not for investment purposes.23
Had the California Supreme Court employed a strict application
of the Howey test, the plan would have failed to qualify under the classic definition of security, because the members of the public who had
invested their money had no expectation of profit. However, choosing
substance over form in applying that state's definition of security,24 the
court focused upon the newly created concept of "risk capital." In deciding that "the act extends even to transactions where capital is placed
without expectation of any material benefits, '25 the court ruled that the
Act's "objective is to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair
chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or
not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another." 26 In
departing from Howey, the court stated that since "the act does not
22. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
23. Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
24. CAL. CORP.CODE § 25008 (West 1960) defined a security as follows:
"Security" includes all of the following:
(a) Any stock, including treasury stock; any certificate of interest or participation; any certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agreement; any certificate of
interest inan oil, gas, or mining title or lease; any transferable share, investment
contract, or beneficial interest in title to property, profits, or earnings.
(b) Any bond; and debenture; any collateral trust certificate; any note; any
evidence of indebtedness, whether interest-bearing or not.
(c) Any guarantee of a security;
(d) Any certificate of deposit for a security.
This section was subsequently repealed by statute in 1968 Cal. Stats. ch. 88, § 1. The subject
matter of the amended section is now covered in CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 1977).
25. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
26. Id. 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a security," the
court would not be bound by that criterion.27 Thus, the court refused
to conform to the rigid, mechanical application of the Howey criteria,
preferring to employ their own flexible standards that examine the substance of the transaction in light of the relevant circumstances.
The erosion of the Howey test expanded into the federal courts
with the decision in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises2 8 and its companion case, Hurst v. Dare to Be Great, Inc. 29 In Turner, a strict construction of the Howey requirement that there be "an expectation of
profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or third party" was rejected
in favor of a flexible, "realistic" analysis. Turner involved a pyramid
plan in which self-improvement contracts were offered to buyers, who,
in return, had the opportunity of earning commissions on the sale of
contracts to others. After an initial investment of their own money, the
buyers were obligated to contribute their own efforts in procuring other
prospective buyers, and bringing them to sales meetings, where, in a
revival meeting atmosphere, they were shown the "true ways" to make
easy money.
In analyzing the status of this venture, the court was troubled with
the word "solely" that served to qualify that segment of the Howey test
dealing with the expectation of profits to come from the efforts of
others. Contrary to the facts of Howey (where the investor's role began
and ended with the purchase of the citrus groves), in Turner, "the investor, or purchaser, [had to] exert some efforts if he [were] to realize a
return on his initial cash outlay. . .[thus] the returns or profits [were]
not coming 'solely' from the efforts of others." 30 If the investor did not
use his own initiative and skills to attract new investors, he would receive no commissions. Originators of the plan contended that under a
strict application of the "solely from the efforts of others" criterion, the
plan was excluded, since the investor was forced to use his own efforts
as well, if he were to make a profit. In rejecting the literal limitations of
the original Howey test, the court in Turner chose to "adopt a more
realistic test-whether the efforts made by those other than the investor
efforts
are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
31
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.
27. Id.
28. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
29. 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973).
30. 474 F.2d at 482.
31. Id But see Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir.
1969) (distributorship agreement wherein the investor was required to "carry on the sale and
distribution of PRODUCT" was held not to be a security because the profits were not ob-
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The court in Turner sought a middle-of-the-road course between a
literal reading of Howey and the adventuresome "risk capital" approach of Silver Hills. In doing so, the court relied upon the then recently decided Supreme Court opinion in Tcherepnin v. Knight.32 In
Tcherepnin, the Court found withdrawable capital shares in a savings
and loan association to be securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In
that decision, the Court reaffirmed the emphasis on broad construction
of the securities "catalogue" found in the Acts, and on the adoption of
for substance
a flexible standard in which "form should be disregarded
33
and the emphasis should be on economic reality."
Similarly, in Turner, the Ninth Circuit, while criticizing strict construction of the test, 34 explicitly cautioned that its decision did not represent a "major attempt to redefine the essential nature of a security
. . . [n]or [did it] represent any real departure from the Supreme
Court's definition of an investment contract as set out in Howey. ' 35
The court made it clear that its decision was a restricted one, holding
that "the requirement that profits come 'solely' from the efforts of
others would, in circumstances such as these, lead to unrealistic results
dogmatically, and that a more flexible approach is appropriif applied
36
ate."
In 1975, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to re-examine the
procedure for defining a security and to consider the numerous modifications that had been proposed. In UnitedHousingFoundation,Inc. v.
Forman 37 eligible prospective tenants were induced to purchase certain shares of stock, which would entitle them to rent an apartment in a
state subsidized non-profit housing development. When allegations of
fraud arose, the Court was called upon to determine whether or not the
transaction fell within the scope of the 1933 or 1934 Acts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reversing the district court, applied a literal approach, holding that since
the shares purchased were called "stock," they clearly fell within the
Securities Acts which explicitly included "stock" in their definitional
tained "solely" from the efforts of others). Although it was decided only four years earlier,
the court made no mention of the Chapman case in its decision in Turner.
32. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
33. Id. at 336.
34. 474 F.2d at 482.
35. Id. at 483.
36. Id. The decision in Hurst, the companion case, summarily followed the Turner
analysis.
37. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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sections. 38 In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court rejected such a literal reading of the Acts, urging an analysis of the "the
substance-the economic realities of the transaction-rather than the
names that may have been employed by the parties. ' 39 While the
name attached to an instrument should not be determinative, it could
still play some role in the analysis along with the other factors. In returning to familiar language, the Court noted that "[t]he touchstone is
the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others."40
Forman proved to be significant in many regards. For the first
time, the Supreme Court had recognized a particular transaction as
falling outside the ambit of "securities." Yet at the same time, the
Court acted to explicitly reject employment of a strict literal approach.
However, many questions remained unanswered by the Court.
Forman had provided the Court with its first opportunity to adopt the
"risk capital' approach4 as a replacement or alternative to the profit
factor enunciated in Howey. However, the Court failed to comment on
the approach, contending that it did not apply to the case at bar because "[p]urchasers of apartments in co-op city take no risk in any significant sense." 42 Thus, the exact status of the risk capital approach
was left unresolved, 43 as was the status of the literal approach as formerly employed by the Second Circuit. The Howey test had been reaffirmed, along with an emphasis on the economic reality of the
transaction in question. However, no firm standards had been elucidated, leaving the circuits free to continue their varied attempts at interpreting the test.
C. Recent Developments
1. The general reaction to Forman
Because the Supreme Court did not establish a narrow, definitive
standard for application of the test, the circuit courts have adopted
three different approaches in defining the scope of the early acts.
38. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. 421 U.S. at 851-52.
40. Id. at 852.
41. This approach, as first adopted in Silver Hilly, had gained added support in El
Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
42. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24. The Court reasoned that if the purchasers were dissatisfied
with their apartments, they could recover their initial investment in full.
43. See generally, 9 Loy. L.A.L. Rlv. 206 (1975).
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The Second Circuit, in Exchange National Bank of Chicago v.

Touche Ross & Co.,' refused to be rebuffed, declaring that "taking full
account of the anti-literalist approach of the Forman opinion.

. .

the

best alternative now available may lie in greater recourse to the statutory language."4 In Touche Ross, a bank had purchased three unsecured long-term promissory notes from a brokerage firm to secure a
loan. When the notes became worthless, the bank sought damages
from Touche Ross claiming that the financial soundness of the brokerage firm had been represented and alleging that the notes were securities. The court held that since the 1933 Act included "notes" within its
definition, this transaction involved a security.46
In making this determination, the Second Circuit focused on the
prefacing clause of the 1933 Act, which provided that the catalogue of
listed terms defining security was to be applicable "unless the context
otherwise required."47 In construing this clause, the Second Circuit
served notice that it would reinstate its literal approach "'unless the
context otherwise required.' "48 The court then proceeded to list six
instances when the context would require that a note issued would not
be deemed a security.4 9 In this particular case, the party asserting that

the note was not within the 1934 Act had not met "the burden of showing that the context did so require."50 In formulating this literal, categorical approach, the court expressly rejected the commercialinvestment note5 1 and risk capital tests employed in other circuits, contending that while the literal "approach does not afford complete certainty.

. .

it adheres more closely to the language of the statutes and it

may be somewhat easier to apply than the weighing and balancing of
recent decisions of sister circuits. 5 2
In contrast to the literal approach, an "investment-commercial"
analysis has been adopted by the Third, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Cir44. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 1137.
46. Id. at 1137-38.
47. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1977).
48. 544 F.2d at 1137 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 77b (1976)).
49. Id. at 1138. The list consists of a
1) note delivered in consumer financing; 2) note secured by a mortgage on a
home; 3) short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its
assets; 4) note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, 5) short-term
note secured by an assignment of accounts receivable; 6) note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business.
Id.
50. Id. at 1137-38.
51. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
52. 544 F.2d at 1138.
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cuits.5 3 This dichotomous analysis views the 1934 Act as encompassing

all investment notes no matter how long their maturity. The prime factor for consideration is whether the note was issued to facilitate the sale

of property. If so, it is deemed to be commercial, and outside the ambit
of "security." Thus, the commercial category generally includes notes

issued to a bank as security for a loan or notes issued to purchase some
asset. Both this approach and the literal approach look to context over
form4 in making the final determination and the results are usually similar.-

2. The Ninth Circuit
In formulating its test, the Ninth Circuit opted for an approach
that would "analyze the nature and degree of risk accompanying the

transaction to the party providing the funds."55 Although the Supreme
Court had refused to explicitly employ such a standard in Forman,56
57
the Ninth Circuit drew from the risk-focused analysis in the V4LIC
and UnitedBenofit Lfe58 decisions, as well as from its own decisions in
El Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp.11 and SEC v. Glenn W Turner

Enterprises,6 in devising a formula: the "ultimate inquiry is whether
[the party providing funds] has contributed 'risk capital' subject to the
'entrepreneurial or managerial efforts' of" others.6 1
53. E.g., McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver, 562 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir.
1977) (neither a construction loan commitment nor a permanent loan commitment
purchased by a real estate developer in the normal course of business were securities);
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) (notes secured by chattel mortgages given to bank by the buyer
and not given to seller as an earnest money deposit were ordinary commercial paper and not
securities); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 930 (1975) (one year promissory note and deed of trust issued for a bank loan alleged to
be needed to pay the corporate obligations of a closely-held corporation held not to be securities); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694 (3d Cir. 1973) (promissory note to pay
for purchase of franchise agreement not a security).
54. E.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross, 544 F.2d at 1138 (the court, employing a
literal approach, expressly stated that its decision would be the same under a "commercialinvestment" analysis). See also Comment, Commercial Notes and Denition of 'Security'
Under SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note? 52 NEB. L. R.v. 478
(1973).
55. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 1976).
56. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24 (risk capital approach not applicable because "[p]urchasers of
apartments in Co-op City take no risk in any significant sense").
57. 359 U.S. at 71-72.
58. 387 U.S. at 210-11.
59. 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
60. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
61. 532 F.2d at 1257.
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In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 62 the defendant obtained a
line of credit from a bank, executing an unsecured promissory note to
the bank in return. When the defendant subsequently declared bankruptcy, the bank sued to recover a portion of its losses. In finding this
transaction not to involve securities, the court identified six factors that
were to aid in framing the ultimate question.6 3 The first and most important of these was time (ie., the longer the funds were used by another, the greater the risk of loss). The second factor to be considered
was the existence collateral and its extent. A third concern was the
form of the obligation, which could aid in determining the circumstances of issuance of the obligation. The fourth factor was the circumstances of issuance. The fifth factor was based upon the relationship
between the borrowed amount and the size of the borrower's business;
thus the larger the amount, the greater the risk. Finally, an examination of the contemplated use of the proceeds was required. These factors were not held to be exclusive, nor was any one factor judged to be
dispositive, but taken together, they formed the core for analysis in differentiating between a "risky loan" and "risk capital." 6 Thus, in framing the risk capital approach, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be using
Howey as a basic foundation, while placing added emphasis upon the
"profits solely from the efforts of others" criterion. It then employed
the six listed factors to aid in narrowing the focus upon the "risk capital" element of the Howey requirement.
In United California Bank v. THC FinancialCorp.,6S the Ninth
Circuit had its first opportunity to apply its new risk capital formulation. In United CaliforniaBank, the court found that a corporation's
agreement to purchase on demand all notes accepted by a bank as security for credit advances extended to another business did not constitute a security. In discussing the six-prong risk capital analysis as
developed in Kotz, the court characterized it as a combination of an
"economic realities standard" with an emphasis on Howey's expectation of profits from the entrepreneurial efforts of others.66 After applying the various indicia of risk capital to the facts, the court determined
that the notes were short-term, payable only to the payee, payable upon
demand and limited in their distribution. Thus, the court was ultimately able to conclude that there was an absence of the risk capital
62. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
63. Id. at 1257-58.
64. This is a distinction that the court finds analogous to the "commercial-investment
dichotomy" employed by other circuits. Id.
65. 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 1358.
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necessary to constitute the existence of a security. 7
A limitation on the expansiveness of the test soon appeared in
United States v. Carman.68 This was a criminal action involving the
owner of a chain of vocational training schools. The schools were exclusively financed by direct federal grants and by the sale of packages
of Federally Insured Student Loans (FISL) to various financial institutions. FISL packages were sold to several credit unions in excess of
federal limitations that had been placed on the schoors loan commitment. In addition, the credit unions had not been informed of the
schoors precarious financial position.
In the resulting action for fraud, the Ninth Circuit declined to utilize the risk capital test, limiting its application to situations "where the
underlying question is whether the 'investor' actually invested in a security, or in essence made a commercial loan."' 69 Retreating to a basic
Howey approach, the court found that the FISL packages included
both a service contract and repurchase agreements and were represented to the credit unions as an "integrated investment package." Declaring the Howey criteria to have been satisfied, the court concluded
that the transaction was an investment contract within the Securities
Act.
However, in the Ninth Circuit's next securities decision, Amfac
Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc.," the Kotz test resurfaced. The parties to the action had entered into a building loan agreement whereby a shopping center owner executed a promissory note to
Amfac Mortgage Corp. (Amfac). Amfac was to make periodic advances on the principal amount of the promissory note depending upon
the degree of completion of the shopping center. Guarantees for payment and for completion were also secured by Amfac. Upon default,
Amfac brought suit, alleging that the note and the guarantees were
each securities, and that the entire transaction taken together constituted an investment contract.
Applying the Kotz test, the court stated that although the note was
due and payable twenty-four months after the date of execution, disbursements by Amfac were dependent upon the progress of construction. Thus, only a portion of Amfac's money was actually at risk for
67. Id. at 1359.
68. 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978).
69. Id. at 563 n.9. Neither party contended that the purchase of FISL packages by the
credit unions was actually a loan to the schools in that federal credit unions are prohibited
by law from making loans to anyone other than their own members.
70. 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).
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the entire twenty-four month period.7 The court also found that the
loan had been secured, thereby creating less risk since the lender could
look to the collateral in the event of nonpayment. The form and circumstances surrounding the transaction supported the existence of a
lender-borrower relationship. Thus, in its totality, the economic realities of the transaction failed to establish that the lender had contributed
risk capital subject to the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others. Amfac had simply made a construction loan to finance a shopping center, and any note given to the lender in the course of such a
commercial financing transaction was outside the scope of the federal
securities laws.72
In the decisions following Amfac Mortgage, the Ninth Circuit
again did not invoke the six-pronged Kotz test, opting instead for the
Howey test. In UnitedSporpfshers v. Buffo, 73 the court held that a land
sale contract and promissory note given as consideration for the sale of
a sportfishing vessel constituted a non-investment commercial dealing
with no expectation that the land or holdings would increase in value
as a result of the managerial skills of another. Thus, the federal securities laws were deemed inapplicable.
Peyton v. Morrow Electronic, Inc.74 involved an employment contract whereby a marketing manager was to receive a cash salary as well
as a percentage of gross sales for the year, in return for his services.
The court, making an obligatory acknowledgement of Howey, summarily dismissed any notion that this agreement constituted an investment contract, noting that the "investment" was one of services, not
money, and that appellant's own managerial efforts played a substantial role, contrary to Howey's emphasis on expecting profits "solely"
from the efforts of others.75 This differentiation between cash and services is in contrast to dicta in Forman,76 and has since been explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court. 7
In Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 78 the Ninth Circuit determined the
status of a discretionary commodities trading account that the appellant had with a national brokerage house. Once again relying solely on
Howey, the court found that the only point of debate was whether or
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 432.
Id. at 434.
597 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978).
587 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 414-15.
See note 42 .upra and accompanying text.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
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not a common enterprise existed. In examining this question, the court
embarked upon its first extended discussion of the virtues of "horizontal" commonality versus "vertical" commonality since its decision in
Turner.

In Turner, the court had defined a "common enterprise" as one in
which the "fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent
upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third
parties. '79 This definition was at odds with the concept of horizontal
commonality that had developed in the Seventh Circuit, requiring a
pooling of investments in order to comprise a common enterprise.8 0
The Ninth Circuit rejected any concept of horizontal commonality, preferring a vertical commonality that evolved from decisions in
Turner and in Hector v. Wiens."' In Brodt, the court defined vertical

commonality as requiring only "that the investor and the promotor be
involved in some common venture without mandating that other inveslead
tors also be involved in that venture."82 The definition follows 8the
3
position.
this
adopted
also
have
that
decisions
of Fifth Circuit
In applying the definition to the case at bar, the court determined
that the enterprise was a "solitary" one. Profits were not shared, nor
did the value of the investment depend upon the ability or the efforts of
the brokerage house. "Merely furnishing investment counsel to another for a commission, even when done by way of a discretionary
commodities account, does not amount to a 'common enterprise.' "84
This concept of common enterprise was further reinforced by the
recent decision in Smith v. Gross."5 Defendants solicited investment in
an earthworm farm by representing that earthworms were easy to raise,
would multiply at a rate of sixty times per year, and that defendants
would repurchase the worms at a rate of $2.25 per pound. After investing, plaintiff discovered to his dismay, that earthworms multiplied only
eight times per year, and that defendants' ability to repurchase the
79. 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.
80. Eg., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1972); Hirk v.
Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977) (both cases held that a discretionary commodities account was not a security).

81. 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976).
82. 595 F.2d at 461.
83. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (critical
factor in the common enterprise test "is not the similitude or coincidence of investor input,
but rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts."); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (discretionary commodities trading account is an investment contract).
84. 595 F.2d at 462.
85. 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979).
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worms at $2.25 per pound was dependent upon luring new investors
into the scheme and selling to them at inflated prices. The court rejected defendants' contention that the arrangement was a franchise
agreement and held the transaction to be an investment contract subject to the securities laws.86
In dealing with the question of common enterprise, the court
found that although plaintiffs were free to sell the worms to any prospective buyer, they could realistically only realize a profit by selling
them back to the defendants, who in turn depended upon selling them
to additional investors at inflated prices. The court concluded that "the
fortune of the Smiths was interwoven with and dependent upon the
efforts and success of the defendants." 87 The court's further finding,
that the efforts of those other than the investor were the undeniably
significant ones, satisfied the remaining Howey criterion, establishing
the transaction as an investment contract. 88
3. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel
In early 1979 the issue of whether pension plans as securities came
to the forefront with the long awaited Supreme Court decision in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.89 At issue was whether
the 1933 or 1934 Act applied to a pension plan that came under a collective-bargaining agreement between the Teamsters and certain trucking firms. The plan was compulsory although employees did not make
contributions to it. The employees did not have the option of receiving
the employer's contribution directly. To become eligible, an employee
was required to have completed twenty years of continuous service.
One month following his retirement, Daniel was informed that he
was ineligible for any retirement benefits due to a four-month layoff
period that had occurred twelve years earlier. He then proceeded to
bring suit against the union and the pension plan trustees, alleging that
they had misrepresented and omitted to state material facts with respect to the plan's vesting requirements, and that such misrepresenta86. Id. at 643. The Ninth Circuit had held that franchise agreements are not securities.
E.g., Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974). Smith v. Gross was distinguished from this case on the basis that the ultimate buyer was the offering party rather than
the consuming public, and that the investors were not solely responsible for their own success. 604 F.2d at 643. Interestingly enough, this latter argument, taken from Howey, was
often used by the court prior to the decision in Turner to exclude certain transactions from
being considered securities.
87. 604 F.2d at 643.
88. Id.
89. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW

1980]

1001

tions constituted violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5, and
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The district court, after denying defendants' motion to dismiss, found that the plan had created
an investment contract, and thus, that the Securities Acts were applicable. 90
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, using a three-tiered analysis. 91 First, the court found that the plan satisfied the Howey requirements for establishing an "investment contract." 92 Second, the court
noted that the economic reality of the circumstances supported this
conclusion. 93 Finally, the court analyzed the prior legislative history of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts and decided that it did not demand a contrary
result, but rather, supported the decision. 94
In applying Howey, the Seventh Circuit found that the requirement calling for an investment of money had been met due to the contribution to the plan, by the employer, of compensation that would
otherwise have gone to the employee.95 A common enterprise was
achieved by the horizontal commonality among the various employees
holding the pension interests.96 The expectation of profit requirement
was satisfied due to the employees reliance on retirement benefits.97
The final requirement that profits be derived solely from the efforts of
others was conceded by both sides, and thus was not discussed by the
court.

93

On certiorari, the Supreme Court took a different view of the situation, reversing the Seventh Circuit, and holding that the 1933 and
1934 Acts did not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pension
plan.99 The means of analysis remained the same, but the results were
radically altered.
Once again, the first analytical tool employed was the Howey test.
In first determining whether there had been an investment of money,
90. 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. IM.1976), af'd,561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S.
551 (1979).
91. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 1231.
93. Id. at 1235-37.
94. Id. at 1237-41.
95. Id. at 1232.
96. Id. at 1233.

97. Id. at 1236.
98. Id. at 1233 n.21. For an extensive analysis of the Seventh Circuit's decision, see,
Note, Interest in Pension Plansas Securities: Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 COLUM. L. Rnv. 184 (1978).
99. 439 U.S. at 558-71.
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the Court asserted that in all previous relevant cases, "the person found
to have been an investor chose to give up a specific consideration in
return for a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a security. ''""c "In every case, the purchaser gave up some tangible and
definable consideration in return for an interest that had substantially
the characteristics of a security."''1 1 In Teamsters, the Court declared
that the "purported investment [was] a relatively insignificant part of
an employee's total and indivisible compensation package."'' 0 2 Since
employees did not contribute money to the plan, their only "investment" was that of their labor. The Court concluded that based on the
economic realities of the situation, an "employee is selling his labor
'0 3
primarily to obtain a livelihood, not for making an investment."'
The Court also rejected the argument that employer contributions on
behalf of the employee constituted the employee's "investment" in the
fund, in that "there was no fixed relationship between contributions to
the Fund and an employee's potential benefits.'' 04
As to the requirements calling for an expectation of profits from a
common enterprise, the Court found that the plan failed to meet the
standard on two different levels. First, the greater share of the pension
plan's income was derived from new employer contributions, a steady
source that was in no way dependent upon the efforts of the fund's
managers. Secondly, any "profit" that might be derived would "depend primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success."' 0 5 Viewed in its
entirety, "the possibility of participating in a plan's asset earnings 'is far
too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within
the Securities Act.' "o106
100. Id. at 559-60 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 346 (1967) (money paid for
bank capital stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 210-12 (1967) (portion of premium paid for variable component of mixed variable and fixed annuity ontract);
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1959) (premium paid for variable
annuity contract); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (money paid for
purchase of orange grove); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)
(money paid for land and oil exploration)).
101. 439 U.S. at 560.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 561. The collective-bargaining agreement initially set employer contributions
to the Pension Trust Fund at two dollars a week for each man-week of covered employment.
An employee who had engaged in covered employment for twenty years would receive the
same benefits as an employee who had worked for forty years and had induced a substantially larger employer contribution.
105. Id.at 562.
106. Id. (citing United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 856 (1975)).
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The Court went on to examine the legislative history of several

relevant acts that had been discussed in an amicus curiae brief submitted by the SEC, and that had been offered as evidence that pension
plans were securities. 7 From its analysis, the Court was able to conclude that there was "no evidence that Congress at any time thought

noncontributory plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regulation as securities."'' 10
The Court concluded, "If any further evidence were needed to

demonstrate that pension plans of the type involved are not subject to
the Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974.

.

.would put the

rest."'1 9

ERISA dealt specifically and in detail with pension
matter to
plans, requiring disclosure to employees, establishing standards for
plan funding and setting limits on the eligibility requirements an employee must meet. This "comprehensive legislation" was an indication
to the Court that "Congress believed . . . it was filling a regulatory
void when it enacted ERISA. . . ."I" Thus, after a thorough applica-

tion of the Howey test, supported by both an implicit and explicit Congressional mandate, the Court held that the Securities Acts do not

apply to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans."'
The first Ninth Circuit case dealing with the decision in Teamsters

was Black v. Payne.' 2 Black had begun working for the state of California in December, 1970, at which time the mandatory retirement age

was seventy years. As a state employee, Black was enrolled in the
state's pension program, the Public Employees Retirement System

(PERS). 113 In 1971, the California legislature enacted a bill lowering
the mandatory retirement age for members of PERS to sixty-seven
years. 114

Black filed a class action against the Public Employees Retirement
107. 439 U.S. at 563-64. The Court discussed the rejection by Congress in 1934 of an
amendment to the Securities Act that would have created an exemption for employee stock
investment and stock option plans. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934); a
1970 amendment to the Securities Act extending an exemption to certain pension plans having an interest or participation in the fund in which its assets were held, 84 Stat. 1434, 1498,
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2); and the Opinion of Assistant General Counsel, [1941 through 1944
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 75.
108. 439 U.S. at 563.
109. Id. at 569 (referring to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1001 (1974)).
110. 439 U.S. at 570.
111. .d.
112. 591 F.2d 83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 139 (1979).
113. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20000 (West 1971).
114. Senate Bill 249, Stats. 1971, ch. 170, § 38 p. 231 was enacted, amending CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 20981 (West 1972).
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System, contending that the statutory change in the mandatory retirement age affected his pension plan interest and thus, was in violation of
federal securities laws. The Ninth Circuit, relying on Teamsters, and
the Howey test, rejected the argument that such a plan constitutes an
investment contract.
Although PERS was a contributory plan,' 15 the court found that
Black's participation in the plan did not automatically involve a rea16
sonable expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others)
"The California legislature's purpose in enacting PERS was not to provide an investment opportunity.""' 7 Rather, participation in the program was viewed as part of an employee's compensation for service to
the state,11 8 and benefits derived therein were "determined by a statutory formula and not by the income or 'profit' made by PERS." 119 In
addition, Black's participation in the plan was compulsory, as was the
plaintiff's in Teamsters. Finally, the court found that PERS lacked the
element of economic risk usually associated with investments. 120 Thus,
by employing the Howey analysis that had been recently reaffirmed in
Teamsters, the court was able to conclude that the PERS lacked a reasonable expectation of entrepreneurial profit, and was thus outside the
scope of the federal securities laws.
D. Conclusion
Following the initial decision in Joiner, the course of defining the
extent and scope of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was an expansionist one, fueled by increasingly
broad interpretations by the courts. The test first enunciated in Howey
was straightforward and simple, and thus was easily applied by the
lower courts. Although some modifications were adopted, it survived
relatively unscathed, despite strong criticism on several fronts.
The expansionist trend was curtailed in Forman, when the
Supreme Court found a type of transaction that it did not consider to
involve security. The decision in Teamsters may indicate not only a
slowing of the expanding definition of "security," but perhaps even a
reversal of that trend. The courts seem to be recognizing that the fram115. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 20600-14 (West 1972).

116. 591 F.2d at 87.
117. Id.
118. Id See Miller v. State, 18 Cal. 3d 808, 814-15, 557 P.2d 970, 973-74, 135 Cal. Rptr.
386, 389-90 (1977).
119. 591 F.2d at 87. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20611 (West 1972).
120. 591 F.2d at 88 (citing United Cal. Bank v. THC Financial Corp., 557 F.2d 1351,
1358-59 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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ers of the 1933 and 1934 Acts did not intend to include every complex
scheme developed in the comparatively sophisticated financial structure of the 1970's and 1980's. In the future, it will be essential for the
courts to continue to establish boundaries and place restrictions upon
access to the federal securities laws, or the laws will become so allinclusive as to render them meaningless.
As for the Ninth Circuit, the continued vitality of the six-prong
risk capital test created in Kotz is questionable. It has a close similarity
to the less complex, dichotomous approach of "investment-commercial" while achieving almost identical results. Having originated as still
another means of elucidating the Howey test, its six level approach is
not as adaptable to as broad a range of securities transactions as is
Howey, and its analytical focus may prove to be short-lived.
The forcefulness of the decision in Black indicates that the Ninth
Circuit agrees with not only the law, but also the spirit of Teamsters,
and will not strain to distinguish it from future cases. Although the
decision in Teamsters may mark a continuing reversal of the expansionist trend in defining securities, it is important to note that the decision did not introduce any new concepts or means of analysis. While
bolstering the decision with the commonly used judicial tool of measuring congressional intent, the core of the analysis in that case, and in
every case, remains the Howey test. Having withstood numerous attempts to modify and change its focus, the test remains so firmly entrenched in securities analysis that future parties seeking to place
themselves outside the reach of the securities laws will be relegated to
making factual arguments rather than legal ones. The Howey analysis
remains the test of the future, as well as the past.
II.

RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5

A.

Introduction

Throughout the 1970's, the federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have been actively involved in the interpretation of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934121 and rule lOb-5 122 promul121. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976), provides

in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any

means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange--

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
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gated thereunder. Much of this activity stems from a handful of
"landmark" United States Supreme Court cases, which have narrowly
defined the statutory language.
Although Congress clearly stated in section 10(b) that certain activities are unlawful if done in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, Congress did not create an express private civil remedy for
its violation. Nor is it clear from the legislative history that either Congress, "23
' or the Commission, 24 when adopting section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5, ever contemplated such a remedy. Nonetheless, the United
States Supreme Court recognized the need for private enforcement
under the securities laws,1 25 and has in certain circumstances, permitted
26
private actions under the statute and the rule.
Most of the interpretation problems faced by the courts with remanipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
122. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), provides:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Relevant portions of both the statute and the rule are restated throughout this discussion.
123. E.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934).
124. E.g., SEC RELEASE No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
125. In the 1960's, the Court recognized the need for a private cause of action under
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964). Private enforcement under section 10(b) of the Act was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)").
126. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc., 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The
Supreme Court reiterated its conclusion in Borak and Bankers Life that "private enforcement of Commission rules may '[provide] a necessary supplement to Commission action.'"
Id. at 730 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). See also Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1975) ("the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the statute and the Rule is now well established"). Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), where the Supreme Court refused to imply a private cause of
action under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Court stated, with
reference to the express private actions set forth in §§ 9(e), 16(d), 18(a) and 20 of the 1934
Act, that "[o]bviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it
knew how to do so and did so expressly." Id. at 2487. At least one commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court will have to reconcile this language with the Court's prior
decisions which recognize a private cause of action under section 10(b). Freeman, Implied
Remedies Under Rule Ob-5: Are They On, for DefraudedSellers?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 10,
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spect to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, have concerned the scope and
meaning of the elements of a private cause of action thereunder. The
courts have derived these elements from two sources: (1) the statute
and the rule itself; and (2) traditional common law fraud actions. The
statute and the rule, by their express terms, are vague with respect to
exactly what must be shown to establish a violation. The traditional
common law fraud elements, however, are too rigid to allow extensive
private enforcement of the statute and the rule. In an effort to strike a
balance between the statutory language and the common law elements,
the courts have struggled to retain the basic structure of fraud actions,
yet have injected enough flexibility to insure effective private enforcement.
The Supreme Court has voiced two countervailing policies regarding the interpretation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. On one hand,
with respect to the element of reliance, the Court has reaffirmed its
statement in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Lfe & Casualty

Company127 that section 10(b) "must be read flexibly not technically
and restrictively" in order to effectuate its remedial purposes. 2 On the
other hand, the Court has been aware of the endless and vexatious litigation that could be brought under the guise of rule lOb-5 and thus, has
narrowly limited the scope of the statute and the rule by placing restrictions on standing and the class of persons who can be held liable. 129
The discussion that follows focuses on the elements which have
been found by the courts to be essential to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
actions. To establish a prima facie claim for damages, a plaintiff must
show that:
1979 at 26, col. 1 (the author suggests that the Court can limit private actions under section
10(b) to defrauded sellers without reversing any of its prior decisions).
127. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
128. Id. at 12. The Court recognized that the practices proscribed by section 10(b) may
vary considerably, and that some practices that may be legitimate in one setting may be
illegitimate in another. The Court found the ultimate question to be whether or not plaintiff
had suffered an injury "as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an
investor." Id. at 12-13.
The Court cited this position with approval in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151-52 (1972) (the lower court read rule lOb-5 too restrictively with respect to
the reliance requirement). See text accompanying notes 295-97 infra for further discussion
of the Affiliated Ute decision.
129. E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc., 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (standing
limited to purchasers or sellers of securities); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1975) (negligent misrepresentations and omissions are not actionable). Justice Blackmun,
dissenting in both Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 762, and Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 217,
objected to the Court's departure from the flexible posture voiced in Superintendentroflnsurance.
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(1) jurisdiction exists under the federal securities laws;
(2) the plaintiff has standing to sue;
(3)

the defendant has misrefpresented or failed to disclose

some fact;
(4) the misrepresented fact was material;
(5) the misrepresentation or omission was made in connection with a purchase or sale of securities;
(6) defendant possessed some degree of scienter; and
on the defendant's misrepresentation or
(7) plaintiff relied
0
13
omission.
This discussion first examines each element and its treatment if
any by the United States Supreme Court. Next, an examination is
made of recent Ninth Circuit cases. In many instances, the Ninth Circuit has "stretched" the limitations set forth by the Supreme Court in
an effort to reach those who clearly are in violation of the spirit of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, even though the circumstances do not fit
squarely within the scope of the elements as defined by the Supreme
Court.
B. Elements of the PrimaFacie Case

1. Jurisdiction
The initial inquiry with respect to any lOb-5 action is whether the
court may properly hear the claim. This section deals with the jurisdictional requirements under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, and with two
common bars to suit: the running of the statute of limitations, and the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In general, the Ninth
Circuit has taken a liberal approach to each of these issues.
a. thejurisdictionalrequirement

Perhaps the most liberally interpreted element of a private cause
of action for damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is the jurisdictional requirement: the alleged violation must occur "by the [direct or
indirect] use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange
.... 131 The Ninth Circuit has read this requirement broadly to in130. See generally 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 8.18.9 at 193-223 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERO].
131. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976); Rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1979). See notes 121 and 122 supra for a full statement of the
statute and the rule.
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dude remote uses of an interstate instrumentality; almost any use is
sufficient.
In Matheson v. Armbrust, 3"' 2 for example, the Ninth Circuit found
that the alleged fraud was practiced in connection with the use of an
interstate, long-distance telephone line. Even though the transaction
was not actually consummated by means of the interstate telephone
comline, the court upheld the district court's finding that the fraud
33
menced with interstate negotiations over the telephone line.'
In Ellis v. Carter, 34 the interstate transportation of stock certificates from New York to Los Angeles via a commercial airline was held
by the Ninth Circuit to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. The
court found that even though there was a substantial delay between the
transfer of the stock certificates and the actual consummation of the
sale, the use of the commercial airline was for the purpose of consumrule lOb-5, was used in
mating the sale, and therefore, for purposes of
35
sale.1
fraudulent
alleged
the
with
connection
The Ninth Circuit recently reached a similar conclusion in Hilton
v. Mumaw,136 when the court held that the mailing of a contract that
was clearly prepared in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the plaintiff
was enough to confer federal jurisdiction. The court stated, "The jurisdictional requirement of Rule lOb-5 is satisfied even if the use of the
mails is not itself a fraudulent act. It suffices if [the mails were used]
137
. . .in furtherance of the alleged fraud."'
Although these cases seem to indicate that the court will clutch at
any jurisdictional "straw" when a fraudulent scheme with respect to a
securities transaction is uncovered, the Ninth Circuit has at least on one
occasion found no jurisdiction under the federal securities laws. In
Burke v. Trple A Machine Shop, Inc.,138 plaintiff alleged a violation
under rule lOb-5 arising out of the defendant corporation's repurchase
of plaintiffs stock. The court found that there was no federal question
presented and therefore no jurisdiction under rule lOb-5:
132. 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961).
133. Id. at 673. Appellant argued that all of the fraud took place within the state of
Oregon, after the interstate telephone call in question. The district court, however, found
that defendant had engaged in a scheme to defraud plaintiff which commenced with the
long-distance telephone call, and continued to the consummation of the transaction. Upon
this finding, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the alleged fraud was practiced in connection
with the use of the interstate telephone line.
134. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
135. Id. at 274.
136. 522 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1975).
137. Id. at 602.
138. 438 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
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It [was] not contended that the mails were used. There was no
interstate negotiation or purchase of the plaintiff's stock. We
conclude that there was also no use of an 'instrumentality of
interstate commerce' within the contemplation of the statute
companies' counby reason of two local telephone calls to the
39
sel who was also an assistant secretary.1
b. the statute of limitations

Since section 10(b) contains no express civil private cause of action, Congress obviously did not include a statute of limitations for actions brought under the statute or the rule. The Ninth Circuit, in
accordance with federal policy, 14 0 has adopted and applied an appropriate local statute of limitations:' 4 1 the state statute of limitations governing general fraud actions. 42
In Hilton v. Mumaw, 14 1 the Ninth Circuit noted that although the
state statute of limitations for fraud actions governs the statutory period within which rule lOb-5 claims may be brought, federal law determines when the period begins to run.'" Federal law provides that the
period commences when plaintiff discovers, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fraud. 145 Accordingly,
139. Id. at 979 (emphasis added). The court did suggest, however, that there may still be
a valid cause of action under state law. Id.
140. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) ("[a]s to actions at law, the
silence of Congress has been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy to adopt the local
law of limitation").
141. See Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 395) (Ninth Circuit applied the California statute of limitations for fraud
actions).
142. See Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 914-16 (9th Cir. 1971)
(the court applied the Washington statute of limitations pertaining to general fraud actions).
In California, the appropriate statute of limitations for rule lOb-5 actions is the California
statute of limitations for fraud actions set forth in CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338(4) (Deering
Supp. 1979) (three year period). Cf. Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (D.C. Ga.
1977) (four-year limitation associated with Georgia's fraud remedy was appropriate in rule
lOb-5 action). See Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1967); Sackett v. Beaman,
399 F.2d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1968). In both Turner and Sackett the Ninth Circuit adopted
and applied the California general fraud limitations period.
143. See notes 136-137 supra and accompanying text.
144. 522 F.2d at 601-02.
145. Id See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), in which the Supreme Court
stated that:
this Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff
has been injured by fraud and 'remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want
of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the
fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part
of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other
party.'
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the court in Hilton held that the question of when the Hiltons discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud was an issue for the
trier of fact, and that the district court had improperly directed a ver146
dict that the Hiltons' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
c.

resjudicataand collateralestoppel

The Ninth Circuit is reluctant to preclude recovery under rule lOb5 by using the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel in cases
when similar factual contentions are presented to state courts. In Clark
v. Watchie, 147 for example, two complaints were filed, one in state court
and the other in federal court. The state court complaint alleged
breach of fiduciary duty and mismanagement of partnership affairs.
The federal court complaint alleged material misrepresentations and
omissions in connection with the sale of partnership units. The district
court held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded the federal rule lOb-5 action which was heard subsequent to a
report of the special master in the state action finding that defendant
had acted in good faith.' 4 The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Considering
first the issue of res judicata, the Ninth Circuit stated that the doctrine
would preclude a second suit only if the cause of action in the second
suit is identical to that brought in the first suit. 14 9 In agreement with
a
the Second Circuit, the court concluded that "a Rule lOb-5 claim 'is
different cause of action from the claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
and is one which is cognizable only in federal courts.' "150 The 1934
Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts to consider rule
lOb-5 claims. 5 '
The court also held that two defendants, who were not parties to
the prior state court action, could not collaterally estop plaintiffs from
Id. at 397 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874)). Accord, Turner v.
Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1967) (court looked to California law to determine when
statute of limitations began to run); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 455-56 (9th Cir. 1956)
(court also looked to state law). The Ninth Circuit explained in Hilton that Errion did not
hold contrary since the state rule applied therein was identical to the federal rule. 522 F.2d
at 602 n.13.
146. 522 F.2d at 602.
147. 513 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
148. Id. at 996.
149. See lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 710.441[2], at 3777 (2d ed. 1974).
150. 513 F.2d at 997 (quoting Abramson v. Penwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d
Cir. 1969).
151. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) provides
in part that "[t]he district courts of the United States... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
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bringing a subsequent lOb-5 action when the factual issues in the two
suits were not identical. 5 2 The Ninth Circuit found that while the state
court suit resolved issues of nondisclosure with respect to operation of
the partnership itself, in other words, that defendant acted in good
faith, issues of nondisclosure with respect to the sale of the partnership
units were not decided by the state court.1 53 The court concluded that
because the state action neither mentioned nor referred to issues under
the federal securities
laws, these issues could be relitigated in the fed54
eral action.'

2.

Standing

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for a motion to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.' 55 The discussion that follows examines the elements necessary to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5.
a. individualactions
Standing to sue is a crucial element of any suit brought under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1 56 In Blue Chio Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,'57 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the so-called
Birnbaum rule, 58 adopted almost unanimously by the lower courts,
limiting standing in private damage actions under section 10(b) and
152. The Ninth Circuit applied the 3-part test to determine collateral estoppel set forth by
the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 323-24 (1971) (citing Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942)): Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? Was
the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in
question? 513 F.2d at 998.
153. 513 F.2d at 998-99.
154. Id. at 999. The state court had made one finding mentioning the sale of partnership
units, but this finding was unnecessary to the state court judgment. Id. at 999. The court
further held that the legal standards to be applied to each case were substantially different.
Although defendant was found not liable under state law because of his honest mistakes
which did not amount to breach of his fiduciary duty, the court noted that rule lob-5 liability could nonetheless be based on negligence. This standard of liability has been since negated by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1975), which held that negligence would
not support a rule lOb-5 claim; some degree of scienter is necessary. See notes 335-84 infra
for a discussion of the scienter requirement.
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C. Appendix at 407 (1976).
156. See text accompanying note 281 infra for a discussion of the close relationship between the standing, reliance and "in connection with" requirements.
157. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
158. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 343 U.S. 956
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rule lOb-5 to actualpurchasersor sellers.15 9 The Court reasoned that

adoption of this standing limitation was necessary to prevent potential
or "strike" suits and potential abuse in discovery procenuisance
60
dures:
In the absence of the Birnbaum doctrine, bystanders to the
securities marketing process could await developments on the
sidelines without risk, claiming that inaccuracies in disclosure
caused nonselling in a falling market and that unduly pessimistic predictions by the issuer followed by a rising market
caused them to allow retrospectively golden opportunities to

pass.'

61

Problems have arisen among the lower courts with regard to the
scope of the terms "actual purchasers" and "actual sellers." The definitional sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide that the
include contracts "to buy, purchase or
"purchase"
terms "buy"
A',
thele"terml
~"1',62
• and

otherwise acquire,

the terms "sale" and "sell" include contracts

"to sell or otherwise dispose of."'' 63 The Supreme Court thus has rec-

ognized holders of such contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell
securities as puts, calls or options as "purchasers" or "sellers" for purposes of rule l0b-5.'64 The Court, however, refused to find that plain-

tiffs in Blue Chip Stamps who alleged a "lost opportunity" to purchase
65
stock were purchasers or sellers within the meaning of the Act.1

(1951) (a person who is neither a purchaser or seller of securities may not bring an action
under section 10(b) or rule lOb-5).
159. 421 U.S. at 755. The Court refused to "leave the Birnbaum rule open to endless
case-by-case erosion depending on whether a particular group of plaintiffs was thought by
the court in which the issue was being litigated to be sufficiently more discrete than the
world of potential purchasers at large to justify an exception." Id.
160. Id. at 740-41. The Court explained that its holding was based upon policy considerations. Recognizing that private actions under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 have been judicially found to exist, the Court reasoned that these implied private actions could be
judicially limited, unless or until Congress speaks on the subject. 421 U.S. at 749.
161. Id. at 747. The Court feared the possible breadth of rule lob-5 actions:
The manner in which the defendant's violation caused the plaintiff to fail to.
act could be as a result of the reading of a prospectus, as respondent claims here,
but it could just as easily come as a result of a claimedreadingofinformation containedin thefnancialpages of a local newspaper.
421 U.S. at 746. (emphasis added). See also Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.
1979), discussed in detail in text accompanying notes 374-84 infra. In Zweig, the Ninth
Circuit held a financial columnist liable under rule lOb-5 for nondisclosure to his readers of
his personal interest in the stock he promoted in his financial column.
162. Section 3(a)(13) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(13) (1976).
163. Section 3(a)(14) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(14) (1976).
164. 421 U.S. at 751.
165. Id. at 732. The Court noted that in 1957, and again in 1959, the SEC proposed to
Congress an amendment to section 10(b) to change the wording to "in connection with the
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Prior to Blue Chp Stamps, the Ninth Circuit had adopted the Birnbaum doctrine, but had carved out exceptions to the rule where plaintiffs did not fit squarely within the definitional sections of the Act. In
Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell,'6 6 plaintiffs claimed that they

were dissuaded from bidding on and purchasing certain securities at a
sheriff's sale because of misrepresentations made by a corporate director that the securities were worthless. Although plaintiffs had never
actually purchased or sold the subject stock, the court extended its inquiry to determine whether the alleged facts would fit any of the exceptions to the Birnbaum rule recognized by other circuits. One such
exception was the "aborted purchaser-seller doctrine."'' 67 This doctrine

was triggered in cases where a transaction entered into by plaintiffs,
either as purchasers or sellers, was aborted due to fraud on the part of
defendants. 68 The court reasoned that the "aborted purchaser-seller
doctrine" is not a true exception to Birnbaum because, in each case
where the doctrine has been applied, some contractual relationship ex-

isted between the parties, satisfying the statutory requirement that
69
plaintiffs be either purchasers or sellers.1
The Ninth Circuit in Mount Clemens Industries also examined the
"forced seller" exception to the Birnbaum rule. 7 ' This doctrine was

applied by some courts to protect shareholders who were "forced" to
sell their corporate shares because of fraudulent activity affecting the
corporation in which they had an ownership interest. The Second Circuit applied this exception in Vine v. Benefcial FinanceCo.1 7 1 to protect
purchase of sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any security." Id. (citing 103 Cong.
Rec. 11636 (1957) (emphasis added)). See also SEC Legislation, Hearings on S. 1178-82
before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
367-68 (1959); S. 2545, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 1179, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
Neither change was adopted by Congress. 421 U.S. at 732.
Apparently, however, the Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps does not affect the
Court's earlier decision in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), which established
that the purchaser-seller requirement does not limit the standing of the SEC to bring actions
under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 for injunctive relief. 421 U.S. at 751 n.14.
166. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit found the Birnbaum limitation on
standing not only a sound policy pursuant to section 10(b), but constitutionally mandated by
article III of the United States Constitution, which restricts federal judicial power to "cases"
and "controversies." Id. at 343 (citing Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970)),
167. See generally 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3614 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
168. E.g., Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966), af'g 250 F. Supp.
668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (a customer placed orders with a broker, but the orders were never
carried out due to the broker's deception). See also A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393
(2d Cir. 1967) (customer failed to carry out an agreement to purchase securities).
169. 464 F.2d at 346.
170. Id.
171. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1968).
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a shareholder whose interest was affected by a short-form merger
designed to benefit others. As a result of defendant's fraudulent

scheme, plaintiff was left with stock certificates in a non-existent corporation. Plaintiff had little choice but to exchange his shares for the

price fixed by defendants, or seek his statutory appraisal rights. The
court found that in effect, his stock had involuntarily been reduced to a

claim for cash, and therefore, defendant's fraud resulted in a "sale" of
stock by the plaintiffs. 172 The court reasoned that while "[lit is true that
appellant still has his stock;. . . requiring him to [surrender his stock
'
for cash] . . . as a condition for suit seems a needless formality."173
The Ninth Circuit in Mount Clemens Industries found neither of

these exceptions applicable. Plaintiffs therein possessed no contractual
rights to either purchase or sell the securities in question. Further,
plaintiffs had never owned the subject shares and because they chose

not to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company which was
the actual seller of the shares, the court refused to bootstrap them into
the position of forced sellers.' 74
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps,
the forced seller doctrine was applied by the Seventh Circuit in Daniel
v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 7 5 when union members

were "forced" to contribute to a pension plan. The court held that the
definition of "sale" under the 1934 Act does not require volition. Thus,

found to be a "sale" for
forced contribution to the pension plan was
76
lOb-5.'
rule
and
10(b)
section
of
purposes
The Ninth Circuit followed Blue Chp Stamps in Williams v. Sin-

clair.1 77 Williams involved a class action brought by corporate shareholders against the corporation, which had allegedly issued a

materially misleading prospectus in connection with a public offering
172. Id. at 634.
173. Id See also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (plaintiff corporation was considered a forced seller when
the acquiring corporation's manipulation of the market price of the target company's stock
defeated plaintiffs tender offer, and, as a result, plaintiff was required to either sell its shares
or those received in exchange pursuant to antitrust laws). See also Dudley v. Southeastern
Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) ("a
shareholder should be treated as a seller when the nature of his investment has been fundamentally changed from an interest in a going enterprise into a right solely to a payment of
money for his shares").
174. 464 F.2d at 347 n.14.
175. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
176. Id. at 1243-44. This suggests that the forced seller doctrine may survive Blue Chip
Stamps in that "actual sellers" under the Act may include forced sellers. Neither the
Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has as yet faced this issue.
177. 529 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
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of stock. Current shareholders were given the opportunity to purchase
additional shares at a discount price through warrants issued to them.
The class seeking relief consisted of: (1) those who were induced to
exercise the warrants to purchase additional stock in reliance on the
misleading prospectus; and (2) those who either sold their previouslyheld shares at a loss, or retained their shares in reliance on the prospectus. The court held that the shareholders who merely retained their
previously-held shares after the prospectus was issued did not qualify
as either purchasers or sellers under rule 1Ob-5, even though they were
offered warrants to purchase additional stock. The court held, "The
warrants offered to the existing shareholders . . . in the prospectus
were neither contracts to purchase or to sell securities within the defini'78
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)."'
The Ninth Circuit's refusal in Williams to confer standing on potential purchasers of shares who refrained from purchasing in reliance
on the misleading prospectus was fully anticipated by the- Supreme
Court in Blue Chip Stamps. The Court recognized that three classes of
potential plaintiffs would be barred from suit under rule lOb-5 by the
Birnbaum limitation.179 The two sub-groups of plaintiffs barred in Wil180
liams fell within the second and third categories.
In Ohashi v. Verit Industries,"I the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot establish standing under rule lob-5 based upon his inability
to sell or offer to sell his stock to third parties, even if such inability was
caused by defendant's fraudulent or deceptive acts. 82 The plaintiff
178. Id. at 1389. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(13)-(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)
(1976) set forth in pertinent part in text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
179. The three classes of potential plaintiffs that would be barred from suit under rule
lOb-5 by Birnbaum are: (1) potential purchasers of shares who decided not to puchase because of omissions of favorable material; (2) actual shareholders of the issuer who allege
they decided not to sell their shares because of omissions of unfavorable material; and (3)
shareholders, creditors and others related to an issuer who suffered loss in the value of their
investment due to corporate or insider activities in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities which violate rule lOb-5. 421 U.S. at 737-38.
180. The Supreme Court commented that plaintiffs in categories (2) and (3), see note 179,
supra, could frequently circumvent Birnbaum by bringing a derivative action on behalf of
the corporate issuer if the latter was a purchaser or seller of securities. 421 U.S. at 738. The
barred plaintiffs in Williams, however, fell within the second and third categories of plaintiffs barred by Birnbaum, and therefore, the derivative action route would not be available to
them. However, although plaintiffs found themselves without a federal remedy, the same
alleged conduct may have provided a basis for recovery under state law. In Blue Chip
Stamps, a state court class action filed by respondent was held in abeyance pending the
decision of the Supreme Court. Id. at 739 n.9 (citing Manor Drugs v. Blue Chip Stamps,
No. C-5652 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County)).
181. 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
182. The private offering exemption of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
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sold his shares in one company in exchange for stock in the defendant
corporation which was not reported under the Securities Act of 1933 in
reliance on the private offering exemption. 8 As part of the exchange,
plaintiff executed an agreement under which transfer of plaintiff's
shares would be restricted until certain conditions were met. A few
years after the exchange, when plaintiff sought to have these transfer
restrictions removed, defendants allegedly falsely assured him that
steps were being taken in that direction. Plaintiff sued, alleging a conspiracy to keep his stock off the market in an effort to artificially raise
the price of the publicly-traded stock.
The Ninth Circuit determined that plaintiff fell within the third
category of potential plaintiffs mentioned in Blue Chip Stamps who
would be barred from suing under rule lOb-5 by the Birnbaum rule:
"shareholders; creditors, and perhaps others related to an issuer who
suffered loss in the value of their investment due to corporate or insider
activities .

.

. .,I"

The court held, however, that although plaintiff

could not sue as a frustrated seller, he might be able to sue as a defrauded purchaser if the alleged fraud had occurred in connection with
his acquisition of the shares in the exchange.' 8 5 The court ultimately
found that Ohashi had standing to sue pursuant to this theory.186 In
finding that Ohashi did have standing to sue, the court expanded the
in connection
purchaser-seller requirement to include fraud committed
87
with the still executory purchase agreements.
b. derivative actions
In Kidwell v. Meikle,'88 the Ninth Circuit held that a shareholder
who owned membership shares in a non-profit corporation which had
transferred its assets to defendant corporation, could sue derivatively to
redress the harm done to his corporation as a result of the allegedly
fraudulent transfer.' 9 The court found that the non-profit corporation
was a "purchaser" of securities in that it transferred its assets to the
defendant corporation in exchange for stock. 9 ' The court, however,
§ 77d(2)(1976), exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering" from
the mandatory registration provisions of the Act.
183. Id. at 852.
184. Id. at 852-53. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
185. Id. at 853.
186. Id.
187. See text accompanying notes 280-85 infra for further discussion of Ohashi and the
"in connection with" requirement.
188. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
189. Id. at 1290.
190. Id.
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denied standing to plaintiff shareholders who sought to bring individual actions against defendant corporation. Two such shareholder
members of the merged non-profit corporation claimed standing to sue
as relators on behalf of the public based on a provision in the corporate
by-laws requiring any surplus obtained on dissolution to be donated to
non-profit charitable, recreational, or educational organizations. The
court held that since the action was brought to enforce the public's
rights, and not plaintiffs' own rights, plaintiffs were not the real parties
in interest, and further, that plaintiffs could not force the attorney general, as the real party in interest, to join in the suit. 191 The court also
denied standing to two corporate director plaintiffs who attempted to
bring a director's derivative suit on behalf of the non-profit corporation.1 92 The court held that plaintiffs were not purchasers or sellers
under rule lOb-5, and more fundamentally, that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not authorize a director's derivative action.93
c. class actions

The Ninth Circuit has taken a liberal view toward allowing class
actions under rule 1Ob-5, especially when a broad pattern of fraudulent
activity can be established. In Blackie v. Barrack,194 the court allowed
a class action brought on behalf of stock purchasers who were allegedly
misled by misrepresentations in the corporation's annual financial report that falsely indicated that defendant corporation was in sound
financial condition. Defendants appealed the district court's conditional certification of the suit as a class action on the ground that factors such as particular misrepresentations, degree of reliance, and proof
of damages varied with respect to individual class members so that no
common question was presented. The Ninth Circuit held that the class
was united by a common interest in determining whether defendants'
overall course of conduct was in violation of the securities laws. The
court found that slight differences in the positions of individual class
members should not serve to defeat an action that most profitably
191. The court noted that traditionally private parties can sue as "relators" in the name of
the attorney general only if the attorney general expressly or impliedly consents. There was
no such consent in Kidwell. Id. at 1287.
192. Actually, plaintiffs purported to sue on behalf of the corporation for the benefit of
the corporation's "residual charitable, recreational and educational beneficiaries," notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs made no request to certify the beneficiaries as a class; nor did
they claim to be members of the group of beneficiaries they sought to represent. Id. at 1288.
193. Id.
194. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
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should be tried in a single suit.' 95 In support of this holding, the court

reasoned that rule lOb-5 liability can be predicated on a practice or
course of business that operates as a fraud.' 96 The court found in
Blackie that defendants' misrepresentations were "interrelated, interdependent and cumulative,"' 9 7 and therefore, all class members were
deemed to share a common interest in the action.
In Williams,' discussed above in connection with the statute of
limitations issue, the court also addressed the class action issue. The
court found that if there are a sufficient number of common questions
uniting a class, the individual issues concerning whether a particular
plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud in security cases will not necessarily defeat certification of class actions. 19
3. Misrepresentation and nondisclosure-the proscribed conduct.
Once jurisdiction and standing to sue under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 have been established, a plaintiff must show that defendant has
employed a "manipulative or deceptive device" in violation of the statute and the rule."°° In most lOb-5 actions, the device employed in195. Id. at 902. The court found its position consistent with the Advisory Committee's
views on rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule authorizing class actions.
The Committee noted that "a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action. . . ." Id. at 903 (citing
the Advisory Committee on Rule 23, Proposed Amendments to the Rule of Civil Procedure,
39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966)).
196. Id. at 903 n.19. The court noted that "the common question requirement should not
be restrictively interpreted ... particularly as to do so would eliminate the class action
deterrent for those who engage in complicated and imaginative rather than straightforward
schemes to inflate stock prices." Id.
197. 524 F.2d at 903.
198. 529 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1975). See notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra.
199. 529 F.2d at 388. The Ninth Circuit reiterated this position in Cameron v. E.M. Adams & Co., 547 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1976) wherein the court held that individual issues of
compliance with the statute of limitations will not predominate over common issues regarding defendant's conduct. The court stated that a class action is the "superior means for a fair
and efficient resolution of this controversy." Id. at 478.
200. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976) makes
it unlawful to employ "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979) provides that it shall be unlawful
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
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volves the misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts.2"' The

courts have found it necessary to draw the line between conduct in violation of the securities laws, and therefore subject to federal sanction,
and internal corporate mismanagement, which is left to the state courts

to remedy. This distinction was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green.202 The plaintiffs

were minority shareholders who claimed that defendant had violated
rule lOb-5 by eliminating their stock interest in a short-form cash
merger. The Court found that defendant's conduct was not deceptive
or manipulative within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5.2 °3
Under then-existing Delaware law, minority shareholders had the op-

tion either to accept the price offered by the merging corporation for
their shares, or to reject the offer and seek appraisal rights pursuant to
the state statutes.2°4 The statute did not permit the shareholders to
bring suit to block the short-form merger.20 5 The Court concluded that

plaintiffs were furnished with all of the information relevant to their
choice of the available options,2" 6 and therefore disallowed the claim
under rule lOb-5. In other words, the Court determined that because

plaintiffs could not have acted differently had they known of the alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosures, they could not claim that
they were misled by defendant's conduct for purposes of rule lOb-5. 20 7
The decision in Santa FeIndustries reiterated the requirement that
only conduct involving manipulative or deceptive devices is reached by
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The Court found the short-form merger,

which was carried out in accordance with state law, neither deceptive
See notes 335-40 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a recent decision handed down by the Supreme Court. In
Ernst & Ernst, the Court interpreted the word "manipulative" as a term of art connoting
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities." .d. at 199. This interpretation closely links the
element requiring some manipulative or deceptive device to the scienter requirement under
rule lOb-5.
201. See notes 232-71 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of materiality with
respect to rule lob-5 actions.
202. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
203. Id. at 474.
204. DEL. CODE AN., tit. 8 §§ 253, 262 (1975 ed. & Supp. 1976).
205. The Delaware courts did away with this rule and permitted actions to block shortform mergers shortly after Sante FeIndustries was decided. See notes 212-20 and accompanying text infra with respect to Kidwell . Meikie, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). In Kidwell,
the Ninth Circuit implied that Santa Fe Industries might have been decided differently
under current Delaware law.
206. 430 U.S. at 474.
207. Id See text accompanying notes 291-334 infra for a discussion of the reliance requirement.
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nor manipulative. In so deciding, the Court refused to extend rule lOb-

5 to reach breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority
shareholders not involving misrepresentations or nondisclosures. The

Court reasoned that a contrary holding would bring within the scope of
rule lOb-5 a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state
regulation.20 The Court stated that if plaintiffs' cause of action was
permitted, there would be a "danger of vexatious litigation which could
20 9
result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5

and possible overlap and interference with state corporate laws..210 In

effect, the Court adhered to its earlier policy decision that "Congress by

enacting section 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than corporate mismanagement. '2 11 In 1979, in Kidwell
v. Meikle,21 2 the Ninth Circuit was faced with circumstances that were
similar to those dealt with by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries.
Kidwell involved a rule lOb-5 action brought by members and directors

of an Idaho non-profit membership corporation against fellow directors
scheme concerning the sale of
and others who had devised a fraudulent
21 3

the corporation's assets and stock.

While recognizing that the decision in Santa Fe Industries was in-

tended to limit claims that could be brought under rule lOb-5, the
Ninth Circuit stated that "SantaFe Industries has not meant that every

breach of fiduciary duty is necessarily immune from invocation of the
208. 430 U.S. at 478. The Court found it:
difficult to imagine how a court could distinguish, for purposes of Rule lOb-5
fraud, between a majority stockholder's use of a short-form merger to eliminate the
minority at an unfair price and the use of some other device, such as a long-form
merger, tender offer, or liquidation, to achieve the same result; or indeed how a
court could distinguish the alleged abuses in these going private transactions from
other types of fiduciary self-dealing involving transactions in securities.
Id.
209. Id. at 479. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975)
(Supreme Court used similar language to limit standing under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
210. 430 U.S. at 479. The Court recognized that a factor in determining whether a federal
cause of action was intended by Congress under the securities laws is "whether 'the cause of
action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law. . . .' Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 40 (1977) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975))." 430 U.S. at 478.
211. 430 U.S. at 479 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971) ("But we read § 10(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and
contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized markets or face to face." (emphasis added)). See Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw.- Rqlections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974) (Professor Cary urges a "frontal" attack
via a new federal statute for comprehensive federal fiduciary standards rather than extending the scope of rule 1Ob-5).
212. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 188-93 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 188-93 supra.
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rule. '2 14 Indeed, other circuits have found deception when corporate
directors have failed to disclose to shareholders confficts of interest or
unfair intentions concerning corporate transactions.2 15 Deception and
manipulation have been found even when shareholder approval of the
corporate transaction in question was not required under state law. 1 6
The key factor used by the Kidwell court to distinguish Santa Fe
Industries from subsequent appellate cases recognizing rule 1Ob-5 liability for corporate mismanagement is the fact that in each of the appellate cases the injured shareholders could have, and most probably
would have, brought suit in the state courts to enjoin the questionable
transaction had they not been lulled into complacence by management's misrepresentations and nondisclosures.217 In Santa Fe Industries, the shareholders were presented with a set of facts and given an
active choice between accepting the offered stock value and seeking
court appraisal. There were no misrepresentations or nondisclosures
found in connection with this choice; the shareholders had available to
them all the information relevant to decide whether to accept the shortform merger or seek appraisal.2 18
In Kidwell, defendants claimed that the shareholders had not been
deceived by the directors who had voted for the sale of the corporate
assets because, under Idaho law, if a corporation becomes unable to
meet its matured liabilities, shareholder approval of the sale of all of
the corporate assets is not required.21 9 The Ninth Circuit, however,
214. 597 F.2d at 1291 (emphasis added).
215. Id See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978) (court held complaint alleging misleading disclosure in sale of parent corporation caused overvaluation of assets exchanged for additional stock of its controlled subsidiary, and lulled minority shareholders into security rather than into seeking injunctive relief
under state law and therefore was sufficient to state a lOb-5 claim). Goldberg was disapproved to the extent that it differs from proper inquiry on the materiality question of what a
reasonable shareholder would have considered significant. See Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d
1273, 1293 n.10 (9th Cir. 1979)). See also Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978) (disclosure to shareholders two months after consumation of a pledge of the corporation's assets to another corporation was found to be deceptive and manipulative conduct).
216. Shareholder approval was not required under applicable state law for the transaction found in violation of rule lob-5 in either Goldberg or Wright.
217. The Ninth Circuit in Kidwell adopted the Goldberg rationale that "it is precisely
because there are state-law remedies for the shareholders that a deception can be found.
Inadequate disclosures lull into security those shareholders who might bring derivative actions under state law to enjoin the securities transaction if all material facts were revealed."
597 F.2d at 1292.
218. Idaho Code § 30-145 (1967) (repealed 1979).
219. 597 F.2d at 1292 (citing Idaho Code § 30-142 (1967)). The court recognized that the
Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe Industries precluded derivative actions under rule lob-
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found that under Idaho law plaintiff-shareholders reasonably could
have brought suit in state court to enjoin the sale of the corporation's

assets on grounds of conflict of interest and unfairness, especially in
light of the provision that holds corporate directors as fiduciaries who

may not appropriate corporate assets for their own gain.22°
Aside from derivative actions, recent Ninth Circuit cases have

found misrepresentations and nondisclosures in violation of the statute

and the rule in cases involving fraudulent activity by the corporation
itself. In Walling v. Beverly Enterprises,2 2 1 for example, the Ninth Cir-

cuit held that a corporation entering into a contract to sell securities
with only a limited intention of performing, commits a fraudulent act
cognizable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In that case, sharehold-

ers in a Texas corporation 22 2 alleged that the defendant California corporation entered into an agreement for the exchange of all common

stock of the Texas corporation for common stock of the California corporation with a secret reservation not to perform fully its obligations
unless the California corporation later determined that it was in its best
interests to do so. In furtherance of this scheme, the California corpo-

ration repeatedly raised ficticious excuses for not performing. The
court found it to be well-settled that "to promise what one does not

mean to perform, or to declare an opinion as to future events which one
does not hold is a fraud."22 3 As a result, the court reversed the district
court's dismissal of the action and allowed the claim under rule lOb-5.

The court in Walling also found that plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient to sustain a claim under rule 10b-5, despite defendant's conten-

tion that plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege circumstances constituting
fraud with sufficient particularity. The court explained that Federal
5 merely because the complaint in state court states a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty. It is first necessary to establish that the minority shareholders "would have succeeded
in getting permanent injunctive relief, or damages in excess of an appraisal remedy, in the
state-law action." 597 F.2d at 1294. In Santa Fe Industries, an appraisal remedy was the
only remedy available. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
220. See text accompanying notes 267-69 infra for a discussion of materiality with respect
to Kidwell.
221. 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973).
222. In this pre-Blue Chip Stamps decision, the court found that the shareholders in the
Texas corporation had standing as purchasers or sellers pursuant to the "aborted puchaserseller doctrine." 476 F.2d at 396 n.5. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra for a discussion of this doctrine.
223. 476 F.2d at 396 n.6. See 3 L. Loss, SECURmEs REGULATION, 1436-47 (2d ed. 1961).
See also A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967) (court found a
fraudulent scheme perpetrated by several customers upon a broker, whereby the customers
placed buy orders with the broker with the intention to pay for the orders only if the market
value of the securities increased).

1024

LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 2 2 4

does not require nor make legitimate the pleading of detailed
evidentiary matter. .

.

. Nor does Rule 9(b) require any par-

ticularity in connection with an averment of intent,
knowledge or condition of the mind. It only requires the
identification of the circumstances constituting fraud so that
the defendant canpreparean adequate answer from the allegations.225
From this the court concluded that while mere conclusory allegations
of fraudulent activity would be insufficient, plaintiffs in Walling had
alleged much more, including the time, place and nature of defendant's fraudulent activity, 226 and therefore, the court below erred in dis-

missing the action. The Ninth Circuit, however, returned the case on
remand for a determination as to whether the allegations in the complaint could be proven. The court noted, "Not every breach of a stock
sale agreement adds up to a violation of the securities law. Whether
there is actionable fraud or a mere breach of contract depends on the
facts and circumstances developed at the trial or on a motion for summary judgment. 227
224. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), 28 U.S.C. app. at 405 (1976) provides: "Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind.
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of
a person may be averred generally."
225. 476 F.2d at 397 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Trussell v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 774 (D. Colo. 1964)).
226. 476 F.2d at 397. See Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 867 (9th
Cir. 1977) (Ninth Circuit held a complaint alleging "the time, place and content of the false
misrepresentation[s], the fact[s] misrepresented and what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the fraud" sufficient to state a cause of action under rule lob-5. (quoting 2A
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

9.03, at 1927-28 (2d ed. 1975)).

227. 476 F.2d at 397. The Fifth Circuit, in Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th
Cir. 1975), recognized that a line must be drawn between violations of securities laws and
other claims with respect to unfair business activities which are governed by state laws, such
as the Uniform Commercial Code, or other federal laws, such as the antitrust laws. The
Fifth Circuit explained:
In the formulation of relief, however, concepts of fairness to those who are
expected to govern their conduct under rule lOb-5 should be considered. Protection for investors is of primary importance, but it must be kept in mind that the
nation's welfare depends upon the maintenance of a viable, vigorous business community. Considered alone, the sweeping language of Rule lob-5 creates an almost
completely undefined liability. . . . Without further delineation, civil liability is
formless, and the area of proscribed activity could become so great that the beneficial aspects of the rule would not warrant the proscription. . . .In recognition of
this problem, courts have sought to construct workable limits to liability under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 which will accommodate the interests of investors, the
business community, and the public generally.
Id. at 91 (quoting Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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The Ninth Circuit again found a possible remedy for corporate
misconduct under rule lOb-5 in Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan.228 The plaintiff corporation in Bosse had assigned its controlling
shares to the MacMillan Company as collateral for MacMillan's assistance in bailing the plaintiff corporation out of debt. Plaintiff eventually
defaulted and MacMillan held a foreclosure sale of the stock, at which
it was the prime buyer. Amidst other claims brought under the antitrust and federal securities laws, plaintiffs alleged a claim under rule
lOb-5. The district court dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit, however, upheld the claim on two levels. The
court found plaintiffs complaint sufficient under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) in that it met the Walling test-it identified enough circumstances constituting fraud to enable the defendant to prepare an
adequate answer. 229 The court also found that the alleged facts gave
rise to a possible claim for relief under rule lOb-5. Citing Walling, the
court stated that "if there is a 'sale' of security and if fraud allegedly is
used 'in connection with' that sale, there is possible redress under section 10(b), regardless of whether a remedy is available under state
law."' 23 0 The court found that MacMillan had employed a "manipulative or deceptive device" by establishing a debtor-creditor relationship
with plaintiff with the underlying intention of gaining control. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs claim gave rise to a possible claim
for relief under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, and thus survived attack
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 3 1
4. Materiality
Not all misrepresentations or nondisclosures in connection with
securities transactions are actionable under the securities laws. Rule
lOb-5 makes it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material
In every claim brought
fact or to omit to state a materialfact. .. .
under rule lOb-5, a question thus arises as to whether the misrepresentation or omitted fact was material.
The United States Supreme Court set forth a definition of materi228. 565 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1977).
229. Id. at 611.
230. Id. See text accompanying notes 272-93 infra for a discussion of the "in connection
with" requirement.
231. Id. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C. app. at 407 (1976), permits dismissal of the
suit where plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
232. Rule lOb-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1978) (emphasis added), set forth in its
entirety in note 122 supra.
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ality in TSC Industries,Inc. v. Northway, Inc.2 33 The Court held, "An
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote." 34 Although TSCIndustries involved a claim brought under the
federal proxy rules, 235 this definition has been adopted in rule lOb-5
actions as well.236
In Robinson v. Gupples Container Co.,237 the Ninth Circuit applied
the TSC Industries test: "whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.' ",238 In Robinson, the plaintiff
alleged that an acquiring corporation falsely represented that it would
invest significant sums in the expansion of the acquired corporation.
The court noted,
Where the representation in question is a promise of one of
the parties, the representation must be viewed in the light of
the relationship of the parties, the context in which the statement was made, the experience and bargaining position of the
investor and the nature of the transaction as well as the character of the underlying fact.23 9
233. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
234. Id. at 449. The Court went on to explain:
[Materiality] does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of
the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available.
Id. (emphasis added).
235. The claim in TSCIndustries was brought under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(2) and rule 14a-9, 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1975), promulgated thereunder.
236. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977). The Supreme
Court found that because respondents did not indicate how they would have proceeded
differently if they had prior notice of the subject merger, it could not be found that the
failure to give them advance notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure within the
meaning of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5. Id.
237. 513 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1975).
238. Id. at 1277 (quoting Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.
1975) (earnings forecast a "material" fact under rule lOb-5)). See generally 3 BROMBERG,
supra note 130, § 8.3 at 201.
239. 513 F.2d at 1277. Cf. Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 892, 895 n.9
(N.D. Utah 1973) (suggesting that in actions brought by the SEC, the measure of materiality
is the prototype "reasonable investor," and in impersonal transactions, such as those accomplished through a stock exchange, courts may decline to examine the surrounding circumstances).
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After carefully weighing these factors, the court concluded that no reasonable investor would have attached importance to the acquiring corporation's earlier statements regarding investment during negotiations,
when the contract ultimately signed made no provision for investment
by the acquiring corporation. Thus, the court concluded that the alleged misrepresentations were not material within the meaning of the
rule.

240

The issue of materiality has posed special problems in cases dealing with predictions and forecasts. In G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 24 1 for
example, plaintiff purchased stock from defendant in reliance upon defendant's statement that his expected earnings for the year would be
around $155,000. The actual earnings for that year only amounted to
$43,000. Defendant contended that his statement was a mere expression of opinion and therefore not actionable. The court held that although a "reasoned and justified statement of opinion" supported by a
"sound factual or historical basis" is usually not actionable, 42 in this
case, considering "the gross disparity between [the] prediction and [the]
fact, '2 43 and considering defendant's various other misrepresentations
and nondisclosures, 2 " it was not difficult to find this prediction actionable. 45
The Ninth Circuit faced a similar situation in Marx v. Computer
Sciences Corp.246 The plaintiff alleged that defendant had violated rule

lOb-5 by issuing an earnings forecast that was both "untrue" and misleading, in that it omitted material facts required to make it "not misleading."247 In accordance with its previous decision in G & M, Inc.,
the court recognized that a forecast may be regarded as a fact within
the meaning of rule lOb-5. 248 The court further recognized that an
240. 513 F.2d at 1277. See Northwest Paper Corp. v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 137 (9th Cir.
1969) (per curiam) (although materiality is usually a question for the jury, in this case, a
reasonable man would have attached no importance to the nondisclosed facts and therefore
these facts were held immaterial as a matter of law).
241. 488 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1973).
242. Id. at 745-46. See generally 1 BROMBERG, supra note 130, § 5.3 at 97; § 7.2(1) at 14748 and cases cited therein.
243. 488 F.2d at 746.
244. Defendant had also misrepresented facts concerning a prior lease. The court viewed
defendant's conduct "as part of the larger picture of misrepresentations involved in the contract." 488 F.2d at 745.
245. Id. at 746.
246. 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
247. Id. at 487.
248. 507 F.2d at 489. Cf. Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that although an
earnings forecast may be regarded as a material fact, a pure expression of opinion is not by
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earnings forecast constitutes a "material fact" in that investors invaria-

bly rely on a company's earnings projections in estimating the worth of
the company's stock.249 This is especially true when such projections
are issued towards the end of a fiscal year.2
The court next examined whether or not the forecast was an "untrue" statement. The court recognized the fact that a statement proves
to be wrong when viewed in hindsight does not necessarily make it
untrue when made. Nonetheless, if the forecast were not based on the
maker's informed and reasonable belief at the time it was made, or if
the maker did not engage in a reasonable method of preparation prior
to making the forecast, such forecast could be viewed as untrue. 21 In
other words, the court found an inquiry into the circumstances underlying the forecast essential to a determination of whether or not defendant could be held liable under rule lOb-5 for issuing an untrue earnings
252
forecast.
The Ninth Circuit in Marx discussed materiality in terms of fault,
and thus "inextricably linked" materiality to the scienter requirement
of rule lOb-5.25 3 This requirement stemmed from the common law action for fraud which required some element of fault to be shown before
a defendant could be held liable. 4 In an earlier decision,255 the Ninth
Circuit rejected stringent proof of fault as required by common law
fraud actions, and substituted in its place an inquiry into whether or
not the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff not to issue statements
involving misrepresentations or nondisclosures.256 Applying this standefinition a statement of fact. "The 'material fact' in such instance is that the speaker honestly holds the opinion which he has expressed." Id. at 530).
249. 507 F.2d at 489.
250. Id See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 130, § 7.2(1) at 149 ("Earnings reports for
completed periods are of major importance to investors for their historical character and as a
predictive base."). See also Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths andSome Realites, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151, 1197 (1970) (SEC opposition to forecasts of operating results
filed with it).
251. 507 F.2d at 490.
252. Id.
253. The court stated:
[W]e are clear that the determination of untruthfulness vel non of a statement is
inextricably linked with the so-called 'scienter' requirement of a private lob-5 action and involves an inquiry into the circumstances underlying the statement to
ascertain whether or not the maker was guilty of some fault or otherwise culpable.
Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).
254. See text accompanying notes 335-84 supra for a discussion of the scienter requirement of rule lob-5 actions.
255. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
256. "In this circuit, we have never adhered to the requirement of scienter in the common
law fraud sense. . . .The proper standard to be applied is the extent of the duty that rule
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dard, the court in Marx concluded that in light of the great importance

an investor would attach to an earnings forecast, defendant's knowledge that investors would rely on the forecast, and defendant's superior

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the
forecast, 7a jury could reasonably find that the forecast was actionably
25

untrue.

The court next examined whether or not defendant's forecast omit-

ted material facts necessary to make it not misleading. Plaintiff
claimed that defendant should have publicized, in conjunction with the
forecast, all or some of the problems the company was experiencing.

The court noted that a company need not publicize every fact that
might affect the accuracy of an earnings forecast, but only those facts
considered to be material. 258 The court concluded that whether defendant's failure to disclose some or all of the problems facing the corporation in conjunction with the earnings forecast would have

influenced the decision of a reasonable investor to invest, and, therefore, would be material, was a factual determination best left to the
jury.

25 9

By definition, materiality is more difficult to establish in cases involving nondisclosures than in those involving misrepresentations. The

materiality of nondisclosures depends upon whether or not a statement,
which may be truthful on its face, actually is misleading in light of a

Circuit found such a
scheme to defraud the plaintiff. The Ninth
°

scheme in Lewelling v. First CaiforniaCo.26
The controversy in Lewelling arose out of a scheme to enable inlob-5 imposes on this particular defendant." Id. at 734-35. The so-called "flexible duty
standard" announced in White has arguably been set aside by the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (proof of negligent
conduct on the part of defendant will not sustain a claim under rule lOb-5). See note 375
and accompanying text infra for a more detailed discussion of Ernst & Ernst and the flexible
duty standard.
257. 507 F.2d at 490. In light of this conclusion the court found that summary judgment
for defendant had improperly been granted. Cf. Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc.,
534 F.2d 156, 176 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976) (although the Ninth Circuit
found a "heavy duty" owed by defendant to the plaintiff, defendant's comments which the
district court characterized as "an over-simplified, self-serving hunch that everything would
work out all right" were not actionable).
258. 507 F.2d at 491 (footnote omitted). See 3 BROMBERG, supra note 130, § 8.3 at 201
("Ithe bigger and more diversified the company, the less material a given bit of information
is.").
259. The court noted that material omissions might be actionable even if the earnings
forecast on its face was correct if, due to these omissions, an erroneous picture of the company was conveyed. 507 F.2d at 492 n.12.
260. 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977).
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siders to bail-out of failing corporations. As part of the scheme, securities were passed through several brokerage houses in an attempt to
"launder" them and conceal the underlying "bail-outs" of the insiders.2 61 Plaintiff brought an action under rule lOb-5 alleging that defendant brokerage firm had violated the rule by its failure to disclose to
plaintiff either the insider source or the seller's reasons for disposing of
the stock. The trial court found that the sales to plaintiff were part of a
larger scheme to unload "bad" stock and, therefore, defendant's nondisclosure of the existence of the scheme was material.
On appeal, defendant contended that insufficient evidence was
presented at trial to support a finding that insiders were actually bailing
out of failing corporations. The Ninth Circuit dismissed this contention and found that the actual routing of the securities through the
"laundering" process was in itself a material fact that should have been
disclosed. The court concluded, "The reason for this 'laundering' attempt may not be as significant to an investor as the fact that the investment house with which he was dealing was engaging in the practice. '262
On this basis, the court found that the trial court's conclusion that the
omissions were material, in other words, that "a reasonable man
would 2 6 3 attach importance in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question" to the nondisclosed facts,264 was not clearly
265
erroneous.

Materiality was also found by the Ninth Circuit in Kidwell v. Me!kle,2 66 and Zweig v. Hearst Corp '267Both cases involved the materiality of omitted facts. In Kidwell, the court followed a "shareholder261. Id. at 1279.
262. Id.
263. The Ninth Circuit noted that it considers the Supreme Court's definition of materiality in TSC Industries imprecise because confusion still exists as to whether the test for materiality is "would" or "might". Id. at 1279 n.3. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. at 447 n.9, wherein the Supreme Court indicated that in its discussion of materiality in
the Affiliated (ie decision "[i]t was not necessary to articulate a precise definition of materiality, but only to give a 'sense' of the notion."
In any event, the Ninth Circuit found the definition in Northwest PaperCorp., containing the word "would," controlling, at least until the Supreme Court speaks more precisely.
564 F.2d at 1279 n.3.
264. 564 F.2d at 1279 (quoting Northwest Paper Corp. v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 137, 138
(9th Cir. 1969)).
265. 564 F.2d at 1279. Cf. Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.
1977) (Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that defendant had not engaged in
any act, practice or course of business in violation of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 on the
ground that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous).
266. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
267. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 375-85 infra and where
Zweig is discussed in greater detail.
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focused" materiality analysis, which is essentially a variation of the reasonable investor standard. The focus in this analysis is upon whether a
reasonable shareholderwould have considered the omitted facts significant.268 In Kidwell, the court found that a reasonable shareholder
probably would have considered the undisclosed information material
to any decision as to whether or not to block the allegedly fraudulent
sale of the corporate assets.269
In Zweig, the Ninth Circuit again employed the objective test for
materiality enunciated by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries. The
court found that reasonable investors who read the defendant's
financial column would have considered the motivations of its author
to profit personally from his predictions an important factor in deciding
whether to invest in the promoted company.
Similar to its finding in
Lewelling, the court found in Zweig that defendant's conduct with respect to plaintiff was part of a larger scheme to defraud the public.
Also, similar to its finding in Marx, the court in Zweig linked the question of materiality to the scienter requirement.271
5. "In connection with"
A particularly broad prerequisite to suit under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 is that the alleged material misrepresentations or nondisclosures be made "in connection with" a purchase or sale of securities.272
Two issues are inherent in this requirement: (1) whether there was a
causal connection between the alleged misconduct and a sale or
purchase; and (2) whether the misconduct occurred during what actually could be termed a sale or purchase. The Ninth Circuit, in dealing
with these issues, has recognized the overlap of this requirement with
its sister requirements of standing and reliance. Without an actual
purchase or sale, a plaintiff cannot have standing to sue under the statute or the rule, and without establishing the element of reliance, a
causal connection between the misconduct and the purchase or sale
268. 597 F.2d at 1293 n.10.
269. Id. at 1293.
270. 594 F.2d at 1266.
271. See text accompanying notes 335-84 infra for a discussion of Zweig and the scienter
requirement.
272. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976) provides in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful. . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any securi ...any manipulative or deceptive device .
" (emphasis added).
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful to make any material misrepresentations or employ any deceptive devices in connection
with the purchase or sale ofany security." (emphasis added).
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cannot be shown. Considering this overlap, it is not surprising that the
cases seldom discuss the "in connection with" requirement as a separate and distinct issue.
When this requirement is discussed, the courts have found little
guidance in the statute and the rule itself as to proper resolution of
these issues with respect to any particular case. In most cases, a determination of whether this requirement has been satisfied rests upon the
of misconduct Conanswer to a basic policy question: Is this the kind 273
gress intended to forbid under the securities laws?
This reasoning was employed by the United States Supreme Court
in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,2 74 in which the Court was faced
with a novel situation: Whether fraudulent statements made in a proxy
solicitation to shareholders, which affected their participation in a corporate merger, constituted misconduct "in connection with" a purchase
or sale actionable under rule lOb-5. Respondents argued that pursuant
to the 1933 Act, statutory mergers and corporate reorganizations were
not to be considered sales, and, therefore, any alleged misconduct in
connection with a merger could not have occurred "in connection
with" a purchase or sale.2 75 The Court, however, cautioned that the
meaning of particular phrases used by Congress in various other sections of the securities laws do not necessarily carry over into other sections. Each phrase must be interpreted within the context of the section
being examined.2 76 The Court, therefore, narrowed its inquiry to determine the meaning of "sale" and "purchase" within the context of section 10(b).
An examination of the definitional sections of the 1934 Act proved
virtually useless to the Court in determining whether a corporate
merger could be considered a purchase or sale within the meaning of
section 10(b). These sections merely state that the terms "purchase"
273. This basic question seems to permeate the other requirements under rule lob-5 as
well. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (shareholder's derivative
action for corporate mismanagement was not within the scope of rule I Ob-5 where no material misrepresentation or nondisclosures could be shown).
274. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
275. Respondents relied upon rule 133 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of
1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1968), which provides in pertinent part that:
(a) For purposes only of § 5 of the Act, no "sale," "offer to sell," or "offer for
sale" shall be deemed to be involved so far as the stockholders of a corporation are
concerned where... there is submitted to the vote of such stockholders a plan or
agreement for a statutory merger or consolidation ....
276. 393 U.S. at 466.
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and "sale" include contracts either to purchase or sell. 27 7 Likewise,
neither section 10(b) itself, nor rule 10b-5 casts any light on the scope of

the terms "purchase" and "sale."
Faced with the vague statutory language, the Court found it necessary to examine Congress' broad purposes behind section 10(b) to determine whether the alleged misconduct was "the type of fraudulent
behavior which was meant to be forbidden by the statute and the
rule. '2 78 The Court concluded that the purposes underlying the rule
would be clearly furthered by holding that the shareholders in this case
had "purchased" shares by exchanging their old shares for shares in the
new company.279
This rationale was the basis for the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Ohashi v. Verit Industries.2 8 ° Although defendants in Ohashi were engaged in an alleged scheme to raise artificially the price of stock, and

such scheme directly affected the plaintiff, the Court found it impossible to connect the fraudulent acts to plaintiff's purchase without look-

ing way beyond the literal meaning of the "in connection with"
requirement. The plaintiff, Ohashi, had signed a contract to purchase
stock. The contract expressly contained certain restrictions on transfer
of the stock. The alleged fraudulent activity occurred after Ohashi had
277. Sections 3(a)(13)-(14) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78c(a)(13)-(14) (1976) provide:
"(13) The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. (14) The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court found the word "include" vague because it does not precisely indicate which transactions are included. The Court also found the terms "or otherwise acquire" and "or otherwise dispose of' equally vague, in that they provide little assistance in
determining whether or not a statutory merger or corporate reorganization could be considered a "sale" within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 393 U.S. at 466-67, 467
n.8.
278. 393 U.S. at 467.
279. The Court rationalized that as a result of respondent's deception, the shareholders
lost both their status as shareholders in the new company and valuable appraisal rights
under state law. The Court found that "an alleged deception has affected individual shareholders' decisions in a way not at all unlike that involved in a typical cash sale or share
exchange." Id.
Respondents argued that fraud in connection with proxy materials is to be regulated
pursuant to section 14, and not section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The Court explained, however,
that:
the existence or nonexistence of regulation under § 14 would not affect the scope of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. . . . Section 10(b) applies to all proscribed conduct in
connection with a purchase or sale of any security [while] § 14 applies to all proxy
solicitations, whether or not in connection with a purchase or sale. . . . [S]ome
overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate.
393 U.S. at 468.
280. 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).

1034

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 13

actually purchased the stock, but during the period in which the trans-

fer restrictions were in effect. The court reasoned that if the contract by
which Ohashi acquired the stock was still executory when the alleged
fraudulent activities occurred, and if those activities affected the unperformed part of the bargain, the fraud could be considered to have oc-

281
curred "in connection with" Ohashi's acquisition of the stock.
To determine whether the contract was still executory at the time
the alleged fraud occurred, the court turned to the laws of California,

where the contract was made. "Under California law, every contract

contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ' 28 2 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that even though the defendants did not have
an express contractual duty to remove the transfer restrictions imposed
on Ohashi, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed

by California law required their cooperation to permit removal of the
restrictions as soon as was feasible in order for Ohashi to recover the

full benefit of his bargain. Accordingly, the court found that the contract remained executory until the restrictions were removed. The

court further found that because the restrictions were still in effect at
the time of the alleged fraudulent activity, Ohashi had stated a claim
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.28 3

It is clear that the Ninth Circuit did not rely upon a literal reading
281. A favorable determination by the court on this issue also gave Ohashi standing to
sue, for the court had already rejected Ohashi's contentions that his inability to sell to third
persons, or his inability to sell at a higher market price due to defendant's misconduct, afforded him standing. The court noted that it had been well-settled in Blue Chip Stamps that
standing cannot be established under the statute or the rule based on non-sales. It was
therefore crucial to Ohashi that the court find he was still a purchaser at the time the alleged
fraud occurred.
Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly state that if Ohashi's claim satisfied the
"in connection with" requirement it would also satisfy the "standing" requirement, the
court's ultimate finding that Ohashi had stated a claim under rule lOb-5 suggests that the
two requirements are intimately connected.
The Supreme Court in National Securities,Inc. did not have to reach the question of
whether the shareholders could be labelled "purchasers" for purposes of standing pursuant
to the Birnbaum rule, even though the Court viewed the exchange of stock as a "purchase"
for purposes of the "in the connection" requirement. The purchaser-seller requirement was
not an issue in NationalSecurities,Inc. since the action was brought by the SEC itself. 393
U.S. at 467 n.9.
282. 536 F.2d at 853. See Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 749-50, 505 P.2d 1027, 1031, 106
Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973); Berkeley Lawn Bowling Club v. City of Berkeley, 42 Cal. App. 3d
280, 286-87, 116 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (1974).
283. The court noted, however, that even though the alleged misrepresentations were
considered to have been made in connection with the acquisition of stock, the trial court
must determine from the facts whether defendant's misconduct constituted actionable fraud
under the securities laws, or a mere breach of contract, more appropriately left to the state
court's determination. The court stated:
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of either section 10(b) or rule lOb-5, or the definitional sections of the

1934 Act in finding Ohashi had satisfied the "in connection with" requirement. Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly follow the
Supreme Court's reasoning in National Securities,Inc., the Ohashi decision may ultimately rest upon a similar policy decision.2 84 Defend-

ants were engaged in a manipulative scheme to raise artificially the
price of the corporation's publicly traded stock in an attempt to keep
Ohashi's stock off the market. 8 s Such conduct clearly fits within the
sphere of the type of behavior that was meant to be forbidden by the
statute and the rule.

Further evidence of the Ninth Circuit's lenient approach to the "in
connection with" requirement, at least where a. blatant manipulative

scheme is evident, can be seen from the court's decision in Lewelling v.
First California Company.2 86 Lewelling had entrusted his investment

account to an employee of a brokerage firm who purchased securities
on Lewelling's behalf but without Lewelling's knowledge. Lewelling
would first hear of each purchase when he received a slip from the firm

confirming the transaction. Upon receipt of each slip, Lewelling would
immediately call the broker for an explanation of the purchase. Prior

to the suit, Lewelling had never tried to overturn a purchase. After two
years of such dealing, however, Lewelling discovered that the broker-

age firm with which he was dealing was engaged in a massive fraudulent scheme in which "bad" stock was being routed through various

brokerage firms in an attempt to enable insiders to bail out of failing
Not every failure to perform a contractual covenant in a contract to sell or
exchange securities can become a basis for a claim that a defaulting party has employed a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" within the meaning of Rule lob-5
. ... "[Whether there is actionable fraud or a mere breach of contract depends
on the facts and circumstances developed at the trial or on motion for summary
judgment."
536 F.2d at 854 (quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1967)). The
court further noted that although the alleged misrepresentations were made in connection
with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the exchange agreement, the complaint
failed to specifically relate the alleged fraud in connection with the exchange to identified
out-of-pocket loss suffered by Ohashi as a consequence of the fraud. The court, however,
suggested that on remand the complaint could be cured by amendment. 536 F.2d at 854.
284. See Niederhoffer, Cross & Zeckhauser, Inc. v. Telstat Sys., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 180,
186 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (distinguishing Ohashi on the ground that it "raised issues of broad
concern under the securities law"). See also Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 411 (7th
Cir.. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979) (Ohashi cited for the proposition that the "in
connection with" requirement must be viewed with respect to the facts of the particular case
at bar).
285. 536 F.2d at 852. Ohashi had in fact alleged in his complaint that defendants were
engaged in such a conspiracy.
286. 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977).
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corporations. This scheme to "launder" the stock was intentionally
2s7
concealed from individual investors such as Lewelling.
The defendants contended that the alleged nondisclosures did not
occur in connection with either a purchase or sale of securities. The
defendants reasoned that because Lewelling communicated only with
the broker after each purchase had been consummated, Leweling
could not have been induced to purchase by the nondisclosures but
rather was only induced to retain the stock. Thus, plaintiff would
merely be an "aborted seller" and as such would lack standing to bring
288
the subject suit.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the defendants' reasoning. First,
the court noted that the trial court had found that Lewelling retained
the power to call off any purchase even after he received the confirmation slip. His decision whether or not to call off each purchase was
guided solely by the information divulged by his broker. Thus, the defendants' nondisclosures were material to Lewelling's investment decisions. The court held that because Lewelling could have called off any
purchase had he received complete information from the broker, the
defendants' fraudulent scheme occurred in connection with each
purchase.
The Ninth Circuit, however, qualified its reasoning, finding that
the trial court's concern with exactly when each purchase could be
deemed complete was totally unnecessary.289 The important question,
regardless of when the transactions were completed, remained whether
the alleged omissions were "the type of fraudulent practice which the
securities laws guard against. '

29 °

The court found that the facts under-

lying the fraudulent scheme to launder the stock occurred well before
any of the purchases in question, and thus, the overall pattern of fraud
tainted each transaction with plaintiff.
287. The court inferred the required intent from the district court's use of the terms
"scheme," "launder" and "bail-out" in connection with defendants' transactions. Id. at
1281 n.6.
288. Id. at 1279. See text accompanying notes 167-69 supra for a discussion of the
"aborted seller" exception to the Birnbaum rule.
289. The Ninth Circuit had previously held that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 do not require that the fraud occur prior to the consummation of a sale, but only that the fraud be
directly related to the sale. Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff was
forced to pay nearly $4,000 more for shares he had purchased due to defendant's misrepresentations). Although the court in Lanning did not specifically state that its decision was
based on policy considerations, it did quote the Supreme Court's directive that "[slection
10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Id. at 719 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
290. 564 F.2d at 1280.
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It is clear from both Ohashi and Lewelling that the Ninth Circuit
has stretched the "in connection with" requirement, finding the broad
purposes underlying the securities laws a guiding factor in determining
whether alleged misconduct occurred in connection with a sale or
purchase. In Ohashi, the Ninth Circuit stretched the term "contract to
purchase" to fit the period in which the fraud on plaintiff took place.
In Lewelling, the court went one step further and stated in essence that
the timing of the fraud in connection with a sale or purchase is not
controlling.
The broadest use of the "in connection with" requirement by the
Ninth Circuit is in Zweig v. Hearst Corp.291 In that case, the Ninth
Circuit found a causal connection between a financial columnist's nondisclosures and damages suffered by plaintiffs who had acquired stock
in a merger in a market tainted by defendant's misleading column.29 2
Circuit Judge Ely, in a dissenting opinion, stated:
The majority effectively removes the substantive content in
the requirement of "in connection with" when it holds that
[the columnist] may be liable in damages under Rule lOb-5 to
individuals who decided to acquire stock and executed a
merger agreement months before the wrongful conduct occurred . . . . [M~y Brothers stretch section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 beyond their breaking point...291
6.

Reliance

Traditionally, a crucial element of any common law fraud action
has been a showing that plaintiff relied to his detriment on defendant's
misrepresentations or omissions. 294 This element, however, poses special problems when applied to the antifraud provisions contained in
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In face-to-face securities transactions,
proof of reliance may be established without much difficulty. In the
context of open market transactions, however, it may be quite difficult
to establish on "what" and on "whom" plaintiff relied. In addition, it is
difficult to prove reliance on an omitted fact. Often, plaintiffs have suffered because they relied on what they believed to be an open and fair
market. For this reason, courts have held that traditional proof of reliance is not essential in certain circumstances to recover under either the
statute or the rule.
291.
292.
293.
294.

594
See
594
See

F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
text accompanying notes 375-82 infra for a more detailed discussion of Zweig.
F.2d at 1272 (Ely, J., dissenting).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
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In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,2 95 the United States

Supreme Court held that it would not read rule 1Ob-5 so restrictively as
to preclude recovery if reliance were not proven at trial. The issue rose
out of a claim brought by members of the Ute Indian Tribe against a
bank which held certain shares of stock in a tribal corporation. Plaintiffs alleged that employees of the bank were engaged in a scheme to
acquire stock from mixed-blood Indians at a price substantially below
market value and then sell the stock to non-members of the tribe for a
substantially higher price. This was done without making full disclosure of the scheme to plaintiffs.
Although the record contained no evidence that plaintiffs had actually relied on defendant's nondisclosures, the Court held:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld
be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this decision. 96
In reaching this conclusion, the Court redefined causation with respect to rule lOb-5 actions involving material omissions. It moved
away from requiring a common law showing that plaintiff relied to his
detriment on defendants' nondisclosures and substituted in its place a
test which presumes causation from proof of defendant's deception and
proof of plaintiffs' purchase or sale "in connection with" that deception.2 97

In Blackie v. Barrack,298 the Ninth Circuit concluded that "subjective reliance is not a distinct element of proof of lOb-5 claims. 29 9
Blackie involved the consolidated appeal of several class actions
brought by persons who had purchased Ampex securities between May
2, 1970, the date on which Ampex had issued its annual report showing
a $12 million profit, and August 3, 1972, the date on which the company had reported a loss of $90 million. Plaintiffs alleged that Ampex
had misrepresented its financial condition in its 1970 annual report and
295. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
296. Id. at 153-54. See also Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). The
Court stated that
where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be
material. . . that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the
defect was of such a character that it might have been considered important by a
reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote.
297. See text accompanying note 272 supra for a discussion of the interrelation between
the "in connection with" and reliance requirements.
298. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
299. Id. at 905.
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in subsequent interim reports and had failed to disclose factors necessary to avoid making the reports misleading.
The Ninth Circuit relied in Blackie on two theories to support its
conclusion that proof of reliance is not necessary in rule lOb-5 cases.
The first theory reflected the reasoning in Affiliated Ue that if defendant's omissions were material, it could be presumed that plaintiffs
would have acted differently had they known of the omissions. 30 ° The
second theory went far beyond the rationale expressed in Affiliated Ute.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, in the context of an open market,
proof of reliance was not essential, even in cases of positive misrepresentation, when it could be shown that such misrepresentations were
material and that plaintiffs relied on an open, non-manipulated mar30
ket. 1
Other circuits have not read the Affiliated Ute decision as broadly
as the Ninth Circuit did in Blackie. Some courts have limited the use
of the reliance presumption to cases involving non-disclosures and
omissions.3 2 Other courts have reasoned that Affiliated Vie still requires some "general sense of reliance," even in nondisclosure cases.30 3
300. Id. at 905-06.
301. Id. at 906.
302. In Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978), for example,
the Eighth Circuit stated that it is not appropriate to apply the Affiliated Ute test to cases
primarily involving misrepresentations, in that such cases closely resemble tort actions for
deceit where reliance is not difficult to prove. The court stated that in affirmative misrepresentation cases, "the lack of barriers to proof permits the compensatory and deterrent purposes to be adequately served by testing causation directly." The Sixth Circuit read Affiliated
Ute narrowly in Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975), where it
found proof of reliance on the misstated or false fact essential in cases involving misrepresentations. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he Supreme Court's presumption of reliance
meets the conceptual difficulty of proof of reliance on a negative fact." Id. The court did
not perceive this difficulty in cases involving misrepresentations.
303. E.g., Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978), where the Fifth Circuit stated that
even Affiliated Ute requires some element of general reliance in nondisclosure cases. Id. at
261. The Fifth Circuit noted that in Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court found the presumption of reliance arose because of the "circumstances of the case." Id. at 261 n.l. These
circumstances included the fact that plaintiffs "considered these defendants to be familiar
with the market for the shares of stock and relied upon them when they desired to sell their
shares." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 152. The Supreme Court noted
that if defendants in Affiliated Ute "had functioned merely as a transfer agent, there would
have been no duty of disclosure here." Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Affiliated Ute decision dictates that a showing of specific reliance is not necessary if the plaintiff
can show general reliance in terms of a duty of disclosure owed by defendants to plaintiffs.
574 F.2d at 261 n.1.
The Sixth Circuit employed similar reasoning in Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). The court suggested that because of prior
dealings between the bank employees and the Indians in Affiliated Ue, defendants owed a
duty of disclosure to plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit found no similar relationship between the
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The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to support this distinction be-

tween cases involving negative omissions and those involving positive
misrepresentations, at least in situations involving open market transactions. 3° The court in essence based its analysis on a policy decision:

"The statute and rule are designed to foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud-an expectation on which purchasers
should be able to rely. ' 30 5 Often, a purchaser on the open market is
unaware of specific misrepresentations or omissions affecting the marketplace.3 °6 The court reasoned that requiring a plaintiff to prove a
"speculative negative"--that he would not have bought had he
parties in Fridrich and, therefore, refused to recognize a civil remedy for open market transaction without proof of reliance. Id. at 319.
304. In a later decision, Little v. First Cal. Co., 532 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth
Circuit discussed the dilemma faced in trying to distinguish between omissions and misrepresentations:
The categories of "omission" and "misrepresentation" are not mutually exclusive.
All misrepresentations are also nondisclosures, at least to the extent that there is a
failure to disclose which facts in the representation are not true. Thus, the failure
to report an expense item on an income statement, when such a failure is material
in the Affiliated Ute sense, 406 U.S. at 153-54, can be characterized as (a) an omission of a material expense item, (b) a misrepresentation of income or (c) both.
There is a true dilemma presented in a case in which there has been a general
representation from when material facts are omitted and there is no independent
alternative ground, such as an "open market" situation, that justifies dispensing
with a requirement that plaintiffs show individual reliance. . .. On the one hand,
if individual proof of reliance is required of plaintiffs who have in fact relied to
their detriment, but whose claims are not large enough to support the costs of such
proof, then these plaintiffs will go uncompensated. On the other hand, if proof of
reliance is not required, defendants are forced either to compensate plaintiffs who
have not relied and whose harm defendants did not cause or to attempt the difficult, and perhaps impossible, task of rebutting plaintifis demonstration of causation by attempting to show no reliance. It is not clear to us that one horn of the
dilemma is clearly preferable to the other. But in any event, we feel the conceptual
problem should be explicitly recognized as one in which there is no completely just
solution. But see Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1975). Fortunately, we do not have to resolve this issue.
523 F.2d at 1304 n.4.
305. 524 F.2d at 907.
306. The Ninth Circuit is not alone in recognizing this problem. The Fifth Circuit in
Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978), recognized that there might exist a "fraud on
the market" theory of action, but the court then decided it was unnecessary to pursue this
theory to decide the issues before it. Id. at 263. Likewise, in Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider &
Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978), the Eighth Circuit noted that in the area of impersonal
market transactions, cases under rule lob-5 have gone beyond traditional limits of the law of
deceit. Id. at 717. See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions Under
SECRule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REv.584 (1975) [hereinafter Reliance Requirement (suggesting
the Affiliated Ute test is best suited to cases involving nondisclosure in impersonal market
settings where traditional proof of reliance is difficult to demonstrate). See also 3 BROMBERG, note 130, supra § 8.6 at 212 (a person who trades during the period in question may be
harmed by a deception that affects prices and conditions in the relevant market, regardless
of whether he has relied on or even heard the deception).
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known 3 7-- presents too great an evidentiary burden for plaintiff to
carry. The court therefore concluded that the "causal nexus can be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the
common sense that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to
purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock.

' 30 8

In other

words, the court reasoned that it can be inferred from the fact that a
reasonable investor would have relied on the material misrepresenta30 9
tions in question, that an individual would have done likewise.
The Blackie court also discussed the weight to be given to the
above inference. Although some courts have spoken of apresumption
of reliance,310 the Ninth Circuit preferred to give less weight to proof of
materiality: "[We prefer to recognize that materiality directly establishes causation more likely than not, and that reliance as a separate
requirement is simply a milepost on the road to causation." 31 ' The ef-

fect of the inference is to shift the burden of disproving causation to the
defendant. The defendant may attack the inference in at least two
ways: "1) by disproving materiality or by proving that, despite materiality, an insufficient number of traders relied to inflate the price; and 2)
by proving-that an individual plaintiff purchased despite knowledge of
the' 31falsity
of a representation, or that he would have, had he known of
2

it."

If defendant can produce evidence of non-reliance, it is

307. 524 F.2d at 908. The court found this parallel to requiring proof of "I would not
have sold had I known," a requirement which was expressly found unnecessary in Affliated
Ute and Mills.
308. Id.
309. The court noted that its conclusion rested "on the assumption that the particular
investor is more likely to act like the reasonable investor than not." Id. at 906 n.22.
310. See, e.g., Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975) ("The
Supreme Court'spresumptionofreliance meets the conceptual difficulty of proof of reliance
on a negative fact." (emphasis added)). The Ninth Circuit correctly noted in Blackie that
the word "presumption" does not appear either in Affiliated Ute or in Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (an earlier decision dealing with § 14(a) of the 1934 Act in which
the Court held materiality to be the proper test of causation). 524 F.2d at 906 n.22. Cf.
Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979) (later decision where the court stated
that "[i]n a non-disclosure case under Rule l0b-5, a finding of materiality creates apresumplion of reliance." (emphasis added)).
311. 524 F.2d at 906 n.22 (emphasis added). The court does not discuss other "mileposts"
which may be encountered along the way. The author of this article suggests that the court
is perhaps referring to the "in connection with" requirement. See text accompanying notes
272-94 supra for further discussion of this requirement.
312. Id. at 906. The second method has frequently been employed in other circuits to
rebut the Affiliated Ute "presumption" of reliance. See, e.g., Mason v. Marshall, 531 F.2d
1274, 1275 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("The objective materiality of the omissions was
overcome by the strong evidence of plaintiffs' reliance on other sources."); Titan Group, Inc.
v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 1975) (the inference drawn from materiality is overcome where sufficient evidence is presented that plaintiff did not rely); Moody v. Bache &
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presented to the jury to weigh against the inference of reliance. The
court stated, however, it is doubtful "that a defendant would be able to

prove in many instances to a jury's satisfaction that a plaintiff was indifferent to a material fraud. 3 13 This position was confirmed by the
Ninth Circuit in Little v. First California Company,31 4 a decision

handed down subsequent to Blackie. The court in that case noted that
defendant's opportunity to counter the reliance inference is particularly
meaningless where open market transactions are concerned.3 15
In Keirnan v. Homeland,Inc.,31 6 the first 1980 rule lOb-5 reliance

decision, the court avoided the issue of whether or not reliance by third
parties on materialmisstatements may be presumed outside the open

market setting considered in Blackie. The plaintiff alleged that defendants had induced him to puchase a partnership interest in a bankrupt

real estate venture through the issuance of a materially misleading prospectus. The district court found, however, that plaintiff had paid little

to invest in the
attention to the prospectus with respect to his decision
31 8
real estate company 317 and thus dismissed the case.

Co., 570 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1978) ("a specific finding of no causation may suffice to
overcome findings of reliance and materiality.").
313. 524 F.2d at 906-07 n.22. Cf.Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974),
where the court stated that the presumption should not survive if the defendant is able to
show that the plaintiff would have acted in the same manner had he known of the nondisclosures. The Third Circuit in Rochez stated:
We do not read [theAfliated Ute] decision to say that the question of reliance Vel
non may not be considered at all in a non-disclosure case, but only that proof of
reliance is not required for recovery. If defendant is able to demonstrate that there
was clearly no reliance. . . then the non-disclosure cannot be said to have caused
the subsequent loss and under the ordinary principles of the law of fraud, recovery
should be denied.
Id. at 410.
314. 532 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1976).
315. The court stated that "[e]ven though Blackie nominally allows defendants to rebut
causation by a showing of no reliance, it seems to us that such a concession is virtually
meaningless, and perhaps nonsensical, in an open market situation." Id. at 1304 n.3. The
court went on to state that "Blackie, however, did not decide that everyone who purchased
on the open market was injured nor did it hold that any particular measure of damage was
invariably proper with respect to those so injured." Id.
316. 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980).
317. The district court found:
Keirnan knew that the figures in the prospectus were mere projections. He
concedes that he paid little attention to the profitability projections in the prospectus. He was not looking for a conservative investment. He was primarily concerned with a tax shelter for some of his sizable income. Keirnan decided to invest
primarily because three other physicians, including his friend Dr. Fisher, whose
judgment he respected, had invested in Golfside and not because of representations made by the defendants. Substantial reliance is necessary for recovery in a
10(b)-5 case.
Id. at 788.
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On appeal, plaintiff argued additionally that the district court
erred in imposing upon him the heavy burden of proving reliance in
fact. The Ninth Circuit found that, assuming the Affiliated Ute presumption should be extended to cases involving affirmative misrepresentations, 31 9 there was nothing in the record to support the argument
that the burden of proving reliance was placed on plaintiff. Further,
found that defendants
there was little doubt that the district court3 2had
°
had successfully rebutted the presumption.

On appeal, plaintiff argued additionally that the district court
erred in permitting defendants to rebut the prima facie showing of reliance. He unsuccessfully contended that when a deception occurs in the

context of direct negotiations between the parties to a transaction, causation may only be disproved by evidence showing that plaintiff knew

the true facts. The Ninth Circuit did not agree: "Causation may also be
disproved by a showing, as the trial court found here, that plaintiff did

not attach significance to the misrepresented facts, and would not have
attached significance to the omitted facts, and therefore would have
acted as he did if he had known the truth." ' '
Plaintiff next contended that under Blackie, causation is estabfished and reliance presumed when materially misleading statements

are made to third parties on whose actions or advice plaintiff subsequently relies.3 22 The Ninth Circuit also rejected this argument, stating,
[E]ven if we were to agree with Dr. Keirnan that reliance by
third parties should be presumed from material mis-state-

ments or omissions outside the open market situation, the
burden remained on Dr. Keirnan to show that the third par-

ties "received and arguably had read" a materially misleading
318. See text accompanying notes 365-71 infra for a discussion of the other ground for
dismissal: failure to show the requisite scienter.
319. The court stated that "[w]e need not decide whether the rule established in [4ffiliated
Ule] that reliance is presumed in cases involving primarily a failure to disclose material
facts, should be extended to cases such as this where affirmative misrepresentations played
an equal or greater role." 611 F.2d at 788.
320. Id. at 789. See Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631,
636 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (sufficient evidence that plaintiff did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations, but instead relied on its own inadequate investigation of the stock involved).
321. 611 F.2d at 789.
322. The court labelled plaintiff's theory a "derivative reliance theory." Id. This theory
stemmed from the Blackie holding that purchasers of stock in the open market claiming
injury due to deceptive omissions from publicly issued financial reports need not show personal reliance. The court did not find it appropriate to decide in Keirnan whether this holding should be extended to non-market settings because plaintiff had not presented enough
facts in either his pleadings or at trial to permit the court to resolve the issue.
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prospectus [citation omitted] or were in some other way exposed to materially misleading statements prior to Dr.
Keirnan's reliance upon their advice or action.323
The court found that Dr. Keirnan neither alleged third-party reliance
in his pleadings, nor presented evidence below that the third parties
involved were given the same or another misleading prospectus upon
which their reliance could be presumed. Accordingly, the court upheld
the district court's finding that reliance was not established.324
325
The Ninth Circuit also examined reliance in Kidwell v. Meikle.
Unlike Blackie, Kidwell involved a stock transaction among a small,
interrelated group of persons, and not an impersonal transaction over
the open market. Also unlike Blackie, the alleged violation in Kidwell
involved nondisclosures, not misrepresentations. Absent an additional
problem discussed below, theAffiliated Ute presumption of reliance arguably applied in Kidwell.326
Kidwell involved a derivative action brought by minority shareholders against corporate directors who allegedly failed to disclose material facts in connection with a sale of the corporate assets and stock.
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,3 27 the United States Supreme

Court had disallowed a derivative action brought under rule lOb-5
based solely on the corporate directors' breach of fiduciary duty. In
light of Santa Fe Industries, the Ninth Circuit in Kidwell set forth a

stringent test of causation, applicable in lOb-5 derivative actions.
The court found the corporate directors had failed to disclose material facts to the plaintiff minority shareholders in connection with the
subject sale of corporate assets and stock. From this premise, the court
presumed reliance in that had these shareholders known of the material
nondisclosures, they would have brought suit under state law to block
the transaction.3 28 The court, however, did not find this presumption
323. 611 F.2d at 790.
324. Id.
325. 597 F.2d 1273, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979).
326. It has been suggested that theAffillated ULe test should apply only in cases involving
nondisclosure to and deception of many investors. See The Reliance Requirement, supra
note 306.
327. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
328. 597 F.2d at 1293-94. Similar reasoning was employed by the United States Supreme
Court in Santa Fe Industries to defeat the suit. Then-existing Delaware law did not provide
a mechanism whereby minority shareholders could block a short-form merger, and therefore
the Court could not infer that had the shareholders known of the undisclosed facts, they
would have brought suit in the state courts. The shareholders only could decide whether to
accept the short-form merger or seek statutory appraisal value of their shares. The Court
concluded that the shareholders had available to them all the information relevant to that
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completely dispositive of the causation issue. In light of Santa Fe Industries, the court held that in order for minority shareholders to recover on the corporation's behalf under rule 1Ob-5, they must show that
they would have succeeded in obtaining either injunctive relief or damages in excess of the state appraisal value.32 9 This additional requirement seems to go beyond the dictates of Santa Fe Industries, where the
Court failed to find any material nondisclosures from which to infer
reliance. In Kidwell, the Ninth Circuit definitely found material nondisclosures. Yet, the formula for causation stated in Kidwell seems entirely unworkable. The Ninth Circuit failed to illustrate how a
minority shareholder would show the court that he would have been
successful in a hypothetical state court action concerning the facts
presented in a federal lOb-5 action.3 3 ° It seems that consideration of
this issue would require a great deal of speculation on the evidence
presented.
A different analysis of causation/reliance with respect to lOb-5 derivative actions was set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Wright v. Heizer
Corp.33 In Wright, the court adopted a "fairness analysis" whereby
materiality is shown and reliance is presumed if defendant cannot
demonstrate that the transaction was fair to the corporation. 332 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that this aproach afforded the minority shareholders "the same right they would have had if full disclosure had been
made, i e., the right to obtain a judicial determination of the fairness of
a transaction forced upon the corporation by a controlling shareholder
with a conflict of interest. '333 In other words, the court determined that
any causal link between the defendant's alleged nondisclosures and
plaintiffs' reliance thereon, depends on the fairness of the transaction.
Although the Ninth Circuit in Kidwell cited Wright elsewhere in
the opinion,3 3 4 the court did not rely on Wright with respect to causadecision. Thus, there were no nondisclosures in violation of rule 1Ob-5, and the Court did
not actually have to reach the reliance question. See text accompanying notes 202-11 supra
for further discussion of Santa Fe Industries.
329. 597 F.2d at 1294.
330. The Ninth Circuit stated that the question of whether the shareholders would have
been successful is "essentially one of fact, but the federal trial judge should decide any legal
issues that would have arisen in the hypothetical state suit as a matter of law in the Rule
lOb-5 suit." Id. The court did not elaborate on how the judge would determine what legal
issues would have arisen.
331. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
332. Id. at 250 n.13.
333. Id.
334. 597 F.2d at 1291 (cited for the proposition that even where shareholder approval is
not required by state law, failure by corporate directors to disclose unfairness to shareholders constitutes a violation of rule lOb-5).
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tion/reliance, and did not discuss the "fairness" approach. It would
seem that the Seventh Circuit's approach is more workable because the
court would only be- required to examine the evidence to determine
whether or not the transaction was fair, rather than speculate whether
or not plaintiffs would have succeeded had they been able to bring suit
in the state courts.
7.

Scienter

The second most crucial element of any 1Ob-5 action, surpassed
only by the standing requirement, is the requirement of scienter. In
general, scienter requires a showing that defendant possessed a certain
state of mind which made his conduct actionable under the rule.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,335 held that rule lOb-5 will not support a private cause of
action for damages in the absence of an allegation of scienter. The
Court re-examined the words "manipulative,.... device," and "contrivance" as they appear in section 10(b) and concluded that the legislature, through the use of these terms, was clearly referring to intentional
wrongdoing.336 This conclusion precluded plaintiff's recovery under
rule lOb-5 because plaintiff's cause of action in Ernst & Ernst rested
solely on the theory of negligent nonfeasance.337
The Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst required the Ninth
Circuit to rethink its prior rejection of scienter as a necessary element
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In a manner similar to that discussed with respect to the reliance requirement,338 the courts have refrained from requiring that strict common law scienter be shown before
finding a defendant liable. In Ellis v. Carter,339 for example, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the argument that proof of common law scienter or
fraud was essential to recovery under the rule. The court explained:
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative
device or contrivance". .

.

. Had Congress intended to [pro-

scribe] common-law fraud, it would probably have said so.
335. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
336. The Court concluded that Congress addressed section 10(b) to practices that involve
some element of scienter even though "the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is
bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent .... " Id. at 201.
337. Plaintiffs conceded in response to interrogatories that they did "'not accuse Ernst &
Ernst of deliberate, intentional fraud,' but merely with 'inexcusable negligence.'" Id. at 190
n.5 (quoted from Appellant's brief).
338. See text accompanying notes 295-333 supra for a discussion of the reliance requirement.
339. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
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We see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word
"any," indicating that the use of manipulative or deceptive
devices or contrivances of whatever kind may be forbidden, to
construe the statute as if it read "any fraudulent" devices.34 °
In White v. Abrams,3 4 ' the Ninth Circuit examined the question of
exactly what state of mind should be required before a court could impose liability for violation of rule lOb-5. In response to this inquiry, the
court discarded the term "scienter" 342 and adopted in its place the socalled "flexible duty standard. '343 The primary focus of this standard
was the extent to which a particular defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff to avoid the alleged misconduct in the disputed transaction.
The court explained that the extent of the duty owed depends upon an
examination of the goals of the securities fraud legislation and a
number of key factors. 3 " These factors include, but are not limited to:
the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the information as compared to the plaintiffs
access, the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff
was relying upon their relationship in making his investment
decisions and the defendant's activity in initating the securities transaction in question.34 5
The Ninth Circuit found this flexible duty approach far superior to
the more "compartmentalized" 346 approach which required separate
examination of each of the traditional elements of common law fraud,
including materiality, scienter, reliance, and causation. As an example
of the new standard's application, the court stated:
Where the defendant derives great benefit from a relationship
of extreme trust and confidence with the plaintiff, the
defendant knowing that plaintiff completely relies upon him
for information to which he has ready access, but to which
340. Id. at 274.
341. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
342. The court noted that "[t]he word 'scienter' has been used in so many varied meanings that for the sake of progressing jurisprudence it would be better if courts avoided using
it altogether in connection with rule lOb-5 cases." Id. at 728 n.3. The court cited the eminent treatise on Securities law written by Professor Bromberg, wherein he notes the often
imprecise and contradictory uses of the word "scienter," ranging from "traditional scienter"
which means actual knowledge of falsity, to "modem scienter" which extends to constructive knowledge of falsity. 3 BROMBERG, note 130 supra, § 8.4 at 502-03 (1979).
343. 495 F.2d at 734-36.
344. Id. at 735.
345. Id. at 735-36 (notes omitted).
346. Id.
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plaintiff has no access, the law imposes a duty upon the
defendant to use extreme care in assuring that all materialinformation is accurate and disclosed.34 7
This overall view of the total transaction incorporated each of the elements of a rule lOb-5 action without individually examining any of
them. The Ninth Circuit found this approach more suited to the various factual situations and relationships likely to arise under rule lOb5.348

The Ernst & Ernst decision, like Blue Chop Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,349 served to narrow the scope of rule 1Ob-5, stultifying recovery

for the victim. Negligent misrepresentations or nondisclosures on the
part of defendants are no longer actionable under rule lOb-5, even
when plaintiff relied on such conduct to his detriment. The Supreme
Court concluded that rule lOb-5 required a more culpable state of
mind. However, the Court failed to further define that state of mind
beyond the point that it excluded negligence. The Court noted that the
term scienter "refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.

' 35 0

The Court found it unnecessary, however, to

consider whether scienter embraces a fixed state of mind, or whether
different shades and intensities of scienter can exist. For example, the
Court expressly did not address the issue of whether plaintiffs claim in
Ernst & Ernst would have been sufficient had it included allegations of
reckless behavior.3
347. Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
348. The Ninth Circuit again cited Professor Bromberg's treatise concerning whether a
single standard of scienter is workable within the scope of possible lOb-5 actions. Id. at 733.
Bromberg states that:
A comprehensive sc/enter standard would have to fit the enormous variability
of lOb-5 private suits, including:
(1) Whether the violation is misrepresentation, non-disclosure or some more
complex scheme or manipulation;
(2) Whether there is privity, a lesser relationship (such as aiding-abetting or
conspiracy) or not privity at all (as in insider trading cases); in the parlance of this
text, whether the transactions are direct or indirect, personal or impersonal;
(3) Whether there is one plaintiff or thousands;
(4) Whether there is some special relationship between the parties, such as
fiduciary-beneficiary or broker-customer,
(5) Whether the relief sought is damages, rescission, injunction or something
else.
There is a real question whether a single standard can do the job adequately.
2 BROMBERG, note 130 supra, § 8A at 513 (1971).
349. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See text accompanying notes 157-65 supra for a discussion of
the limitations on standing imposed by Blue Chp Stamps.
350. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
351. Id. Perhaps if respondents in Ernst & Ernst had alleged reckless conduct as well as
negligence, the Court would not have been able to draw the line at requiring scienter without further defining the term.
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The Ninth Circuit, in Nelson v. Serwold,35 2 recognized that Ernst &
Ernst only eliminated negligence as a basis for liability under rule lOb-

5; it did not go as far as to require strict common law intent. The Ninth
Circuit therefore broadly interpreted scienter to include reckless or
knowing conduct.3 53
The plaintiff in Nelson alleged that defendants failed to disclose, in
connection with a purchase of stock, the existence of a control group,

and that group's long-range plans to modernize and ultimately sell the
acquired company for a substantial gain. The Ninth Circuit found that
defendants' omissions were made, at the very least, with knowledge.
Although the district court could not find from the evidence that defendants "deliberately and cold-bloodedly" set out to conceal informa-

tion which rule lOb-5 required to be provided,354 the court still found
some modicum of scienter which involved conduct more culpable than
mere negligence, yet short of a willful intent to defraud.3 55 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that Justice Powell had apparently accepted a knowledge standard of scienter in Ernst & Ernst when Powell stated that the

statutory language "strongly suggest[s] that § 10(b) was intended to
proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct. ' 35 6 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that knowledge on the part of the defendants was suffi3 57
cient to sustain an action under rule lOb-5.
352. 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
353. Id. at 1337. Although the question of whether reckless behavior is included within
the term "scienter" was expressly left open in Ernst & Ernst, other circuits have adopted a
scienter standard which embraces reckless conduct. See Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535
F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976) (although there was no direct evidence that defendant knew it
was acting in violation of rule 10b-5, the court found defendant was "grossly negligent in
failing to recognize the unfairness" of the transaction and that defendant, "blinded by a
conflict of interest, wantonly ignored evidence of the unfairness" of the transaction. See also
Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (rule lob-5
requires something additional by way of conscious fault than mere negligence). See generally Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Defne Scienter Under Rule lob-5: Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo].
354. 576 F.2d at 1337.
355. Id. The Ninth Circuit was required to determine whether the district court found
defendants merely negligent or whether their conduct involved greater culpability. The
court concluded that "[tihe fact that the district judge never used the word 'negligence,' or
any of its derivatives, in any of his findings of fact, conclusions of law, or opinions tends to
indicate the he did not base his decision on a negligence theory." Id. Furthermore, defendants knew of the control group and the tentative plans to improve and sell the company, and
therefore, it appeared that defendants' omissions were at least made with knowledge.
356. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 425 U.S. at 197) (emphasis added by the
Ninth Circuit).
357. 576 F.2d at 1337-38. See Bucklo, note 352 supra, at 214 n.12: "[K]nowing misrepresentation generally is viewed as being a more stringent standard of culpability than recklessness but less stringent than intent. [Ernst& Ernst] therefore appears to have been imprecise
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In holding "reckless and knowing conduct" actionable under rule

lOb-5, the Ninth Circuit recognized a spectrum of conduct lying within
the scope of scienter. In Nelson, the court dealt primarily with knowledgeable misconduct. Other circuits have dealt more directly with
reckless misconduct. The Seventh Circuit, in SundstrandCorporationv.
Sun Chemical Corporation,358in distinguishing reckless behavior from

mere negligence, may have stated the minimum threshold of liability
under rule lOb-5:
reckless conduct may be defined as.

.

. highly unreasonable

[conduct], involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
3 59
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.

This standard was adopted by the Third Circuit in McLean v. Alexander,360 where the court suggested that Ernst & Ernst contemplated

liability against accountants who prepared statements without a genuine belief that the information contained therein was accurate and com-

plete. 36 ' The Sundstrand standard was also followed by the Sixth
Circuit in Mansbach v. Prescott,Ball & Turben,36 2 however, with the
caveat that what constitutes reckless behavior is ultimately a factual

determination which necessarily varies from case to case.3 63 It may be
presumed from Nelson that the Ninth Circuit will also recognize the

Sundstrand standard. Although Nelson did not specifically define reckless behavior, the court did state, "We agree with those courts which
have found that Congress intended the ambit of § 10(b) to reach a
when it decided intent and reserved recklessness but failed to discuss knowing misrepresentation." See also Bucklo, note 352 supra, at 219 (suggesting that since none of the cases or
commentaries relied on in Ernst & Ernst require strict common law intent to deceive or
defraud, actual knowledge of misstatements should suffice, irrespective of intent).
358. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
359. Id. at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725
(W.D. Okla. 1976)).
360. 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
361. Id. at 1198. The Third Circuit stated that "[it seems to us that the purpose of footnote 12 of the Hochfelder opinion was to preserve, at least in the context of accountants'
liability, the standards of scienter developed in Ultramares and O'Connor v. Ludlam." 1d
See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); O'Connor v. Ludlam,
92 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1937). The standard referred to by the Third Circuit found defendants liable only where they did not have an honest belief that the statements they made were
true. Footnote 12 of the Hochfelder opinion leaves open the question of whether or not
recklessness is included within the scope of scienter.
362. 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979).
363. Id. at 1025.
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broad category of behavior, including knowing or reckless conduct." 3 64
In Keirnan v. Homeland,Inc.,3 65 the Ninth Circuit set forth a defi-

nition of "recklessness" for purposes of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Dr. Keirnan, plaintiff therein, brought an action under the statute and

the rule arising out of a misleading prospectus issued by a real estate
investment company. The district court dismissed the case 366 upon

finding that the misrepresentations in the prospectus were not "deliberate," but "resulted from the speed with which the proposal was put
together for sale before the end of the tax year. ' 367 The district court
decided only that defendants had not acted "deliberately"; 368 it did not
decide whether or not defendants acted recklessly. If defendants had

acted recklessly, pursuant to Nelson, scienter would be established. On
the other hand, without a specific finding of recklessness, the dismissal
could be sustained only if "on the evidence, a reasonable person could
not have found that defendants acted recklessly. ' 369 The Ninth Circuit
stated that "defendants acted recklessly if they had reasonable grounds
to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted, but
nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such facts although they could
have done so without extraordinary effort."3 70 Upon examination of
the record, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court could have

concluded that defendants failed to inform Dr. Keirnan of facts known
to them or readily ascertainable and failed to investigate more thoroughly before issuing the prospectus. Thus,. . . "a reasonable person
could not have found that defendants acted recklessly."3 71
364. 576 F.2d at 1337.
365. 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980).
366. The district court also dismissed the case on the ground that the reliance requirement was not satisfied. See discussion in text accompanying notes 316-24 supra.
367. 611 F.2d at 787.
368. Id. at 787-88.
369. Id See Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.
1978) (district court's finding could not be affirmed unless, on the evidence, a reasonable
person could not have found that the union had acted arbitrarily).
370. 611 F.2d at 788. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d Cir. 1973)
(en banc).
"In determining was [sic] constitutes 'willful or reckless disregard for the truth' the
inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defendants knew material facts
were misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise themselves of the facts where they
could have done so without any extraordinary effort. [citation omitted] The answer to the inquiry will of course depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case, including the nature and duties of the corporate positions held by the defendants."
Id.
371. 611 F.2d at 788.
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The Ernst & Ernst decision brought another major issue to the attention of the Ninth Circuit: whether the White flexible duty standard,
which essentially replaced the scienter requirement, could survive. In
Ritzau v. Warm Springs West,3 72 the Ninth Circuit found the flexible
duty standard explicitly rejected in Ernst & Ernst. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a footnote in the Ernst & Ernst decision
which cited White as an example of a case which held in essence, that,
negligence alone would be sufficient for liability under rule lOb-5. 37 s
This footnote, however, does not per se strike down the possible usefulness of the flexible duty standard in analyzing conduct that is demonstrably more culpable than negligence. The Ninth Circuit in Ritzau did
not have to pursue this issue further. As the case was initially decided
prior to the Ernst & Ernst decision, the district court failed to make
specific findings as to the defendants' intent. The Ninth Circuit thus
remanded Ritzau for determination of whether defendants acted in a
manner actionable pursuant to Ernst & Ernst, in other words whether
they acted with more culpability than mere negligence.3 7 4
The Ninth Circuit found the flexible duty standard a useful tool in
determining scienter, as required by Ernst & Ernst, in another recent
3 75 Zweig involved an action against
case, Zweig v. Hearst Corporation.
a financial columnist who purposely bought shares in a small company,
touted them in his column, and then sold them in the rising market
which his column produced. Plaintiffs, parties to a corporate merger,
alleged that the directors of the other merging corporation made material misrepresentations and omissions in an interview with defendant
financial columnist with the hope that he would publish this information "puffing" the price of their shares. The columnist, in fact, did publish the information, but only after buying some 5,000 shares for
himself at a substantial discount. Plaintiff alleged that defendant columnist violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by publishing the information without disclosing to his readers that he had bought stock in the
372. 589 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1979).

373. Id. at 1374. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12, which states in
part that "[a]lthough the verbal formulations of the standard to be applied have varied,
several Courts of Appeal have held in substance that negligence alone is sufficient for civil
liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th
Cir. 1974) ("flexible duty" standard).

374. 589 F.2d at 1374.
375. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 191-

92 n.7 wherein the Supreme Court found the flexible standard of liability used by the Seventh Circuit in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 875 (1974), unnecessary to establish a claim under rule lob-5 for aiding and abetting a
securities fraud.
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company at a discount rate and without disclosing that he intended to
sell some of his stock upon the rise in market price he knew his column
would cause.376 The court held that although financial columnists have
no duty to report about their personal financial affairs, defendant as-

sumed such a duty when, with knowledge of the stock's market and an
intent to gain personally,377 he encouraged purchases of the securities
in the market.378 In doing so, he violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
by misleading his readers as to the reliance they could place on his
column.
The Ninth Circuit expressly stated in Zweig that the decision conforms to the flexible duty standard previously enunciated by the court
in /hite.379 The court noted that although White had been overruled

by Ernst & Ernst to the extent that it discussed liability without scienter, the White approach to the duty standard remains good law in the

Ninth Circuit.38 ° In applying the White duty standard to the facts of
376. 594 F.2d at 1263. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendant columnist should have revealed to his readers the fact that the column in question was likely to be republished as an
advertisement in an investment periodical in which defendant owned a substantial ownership interest.
377. The court presumed an intent to profit on the part of the defendant. The court
found it reasonable to infer that defendant knew that his column would temporarily run up
the price of the stock. Further, the court strongly inferred an intent to profit from defendant's long history of previous dealings. Id. at 1265. During the prior two year period, defendant prqflted on 21 different occasions where he bought stock shortly before
recommending such stock in his column. Id. at 1264 n.4.
378. The court noted that this case differed from the usual lOb-5 disclosure case in that
most disclosure cases involve corporate insiders or tip receivers trading in a corporation's
stock without disclosing material facts, which, if were publicly disclosed, might affect the
stock's market value. Id. at 1266. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merril, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Zweig, defendant's nondisclosures
did not directly relate to the value of the merging firm's assets nor its potential growth.
Nonetheless, defendant had a duty of affirmative disclosure to his readers to avoid misleading reliance on his column.
Several commentators have anticipated situations such as that in Zweig, and have referred to persons such as the columnist therein as "quasi-insiders." See ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1603, Revised Comment 3(d) (March 1978 Draft) (cited in 594 F.2d at 1267
n.9). "'Quasi-insiders' are people who obtain nonpublic information from a source outside
a corporation about events or circumstances which will affect the market in the corporation's
stock." An example of a quasi-insider would be a Federal Reserve Bank employee who
trades with knowledge of an upcoming change in margin rate. 594 F.2d at 1267 n.9. See
also Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An InitialInquiry Into the Responsibiliy to Disclose
Market Information. 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 828-35 (1973); Peskind, Regulation of the FinancialPress: A New Dimension to Section 10(b) andRule 10b-5, 14 ST. Louis U.L. Rv. 80,
92-96 (1969).
379. 594 F.2d at 1268.
380. Id. at 1268 n.13. See Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d
631, 636 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977), where the court stated that "[a]bsent the presence of liability
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Zweig, the court found that the defendant columnist had greater access
to the information that he owned stock in the recommended company
and that he intended to sell it than did his readers; that defendant
benefitted in his relationship with his readers in that his employment
ultimately depended upon their readership; and that he was aware that
his readers would rely on his column to make their investment decisions. Thus, the court found that under the White approach, defendant's duty to his readers was well established. 38 '
It is interesting to note, however, that the readers of defendant's
column, either separately, or as a class, were not parties to the action.
The plaintiffs were shareholders in a company named RGC who had
previously contracted to sell the corporate assets in exchange for a
number of shares of ASI to be determined by the market value of ASI
stock on a given date. ASI was the company which had been "puffed"
in defendant's column. The Ninth Circuit found, however, that although plaintiffs did not specifically rely on defendant's column, they
did rely on the existence of an honest, fully-informed market. 382 This
market included the readers of defendant's column. Because of defendant's nondisclosures to his readers, plaintiffs were forced to sell in a
manipulated market. The court found that each reader who was influenced by defendant's column to buy ASI stock at the inflated price,
reduced the amount of shares ASI would have to issue to RGC in the
merger.383 On this basis, the court concluded that defendant intended
to manipulate the market to plaintiffs' detriment, and, therefore, defendant was liable to plaintiffs for damages flowing from his conduct.384

The Zweig decision strongly indicates that the Ninth Circuit will
continue to employ the flexible duty standard in determining whether
alleged fraudulent conduct is actionable under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. Although the Ninth Circuit has been forced by the Supreme
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst to require scienter in rule 1Ob-5 actions, the Ninth Circuit has chosen to follow the Supreme Court's lead
based upon negligence, Hochfelder is not inconsistent, on its facts, with the flexible duty
standard established in White v. Abrams."
381. 594 F.2d at 1269. Plaintiffs contended that rule lOb-5 required defendant to inform
his readers of facts so that they could judge for themselves whether defendant's personal
motives for promoting the stock affected his objectivity. The court applied the TSC Industries test for materiality and found the facts regarding defendant's lack of objectivity material facts. Id. at 1266.
382. Id. at 1269.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1270-71.

1980]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW

1055

in leaving the term "scienter" undefined, save for the exclusion of negligent conduct. Unless and until the Supreme Court lays down more
precise guidelines as to what constitutes scienter, the Ninth Circuit will
probably continue to analyze scienter in terms of whether or not the
defendant was under a duty to disclose material information to the
plaintiff. If such a duty is determined to exist, the court will find that
the defendant acted at least with constructive knowledge of his misrepresentation or omission.
C. Conclusion

The current scope and nature of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions is clearly the product of active judicial interpretation. The
Supreme Court, in shaping this private civil remedy, has attempted to
balance the two countervailing policies of achieving a broad remedial
device and simultaneously limiting the potential for abusive and vexatious litigation. This discussion has hopefully clarified the courts' treatment of the essential elements of a prima facie case and illuminated the
Ninth Circuit's attempt to reach beyond the Supreme Court's limitations to catch those cases which violate the spirit of section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5.
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